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INTRODUCTION1
It was in the seventies and overcast at midday when the pack of 129
cyclists started Stage 15 of the 1995 Tour de France. The stage was the
hardest of the Tour that year: six grueling Pyrenean mountain passes and
128 miles stood between the riders and the day’s finish just southwest of
Lourdes. The highlight was expected to be the hellish Col du Tourmalet on
whose slopes the riders would ascend nearly a vertical mile, and tens of
thousands of spectators lined the road leading up the mountainside days in
advance to secure a prime viewing spot.
The peloton rode quickly up and over the first peak—the well-known
Col du Portet d’Aspet—in pursuit of an early breakaway. Speeds reached 55
miles per hour on the descent, with quickly turning wheels only inches
apart despite the twists and turns carved out of the mountain’s face. The
climb was a popular warm-up for the longer and steeper mountains in the
range, and it was regularly included in the Tour despite being the scene of
1 For news coverage of the 1995 Tour on which this description is based, see Tour
De France 1995 Stage 15 Fabio Casartelli Rip, YouTube (August 23, 2013), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJSP-QoZN2s archived at http://perma.cc/KPU6-9X
VL; Tour De France 1995 Stage 18 Armstrong Casartelli Tribute, YouTube
(August 23, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQDL2PnMcyU archived at
http://perma.cc/9WGA-J2D5;  Samuel Abt, Cycling; Italian Rider Dies After High-
Speed Crash, N.Y. Times, (July 19, 1995), archived at http://perma.cc/S6WC-DBG9;
Austin Murphy, A Test of Heart, 83 Sports Illustrated 36 (July 31, 1995),
archived at http://perma.cc/46Y8-8LHM.
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several high-profile crashes.2 Riders usually used it to test their legs, and
those of their competitors, before the real racing began a few hours later, but
on this day it had started early. For a handful of riders, it would end disas-
trously on one of the Col’s hairpin turns.
The first to fall was Fabio Casartelli. The Italian’s body and bike slid
sideways, felling nearby cyclists and only stopping when his unhelmeted
head hit one of the concrete pylons that lined the turn. The barricade in-
tended to prevent cars from plummeting into the ravine below proved
deadly to Casartelli. Despite an emergency airlift, he died before the stage
was even finished. French rider Dante Rezze was more fortunate: He slid
into a gap between two pylons and off the face of the mountain. While team
personnel managed to hoist Rezze out of the ravine after half an hour, his
injuries that day ended his race. A third rider lay just down the road, his left
leg bent at an excruciating angle. The peloton sped away from the fallen
riders, some of whom lay curled and motionless, others quickly jumping up
from the wreckage, shaking out their arms and legs and brushing away deb-
ris before resuming the high speed descent.
Three days later, Casartelli’s twenty-three-year-old teammate Lance
Armstrong won his second-ever stage of the Tour de France. Race coverage
shows the young American—on his way to finishing 36th in his first com-
pleted Tour—pointing repeatedly to the sky, both arms raised in tribute to
his fallen friend as he crossed the finish line, his head unself-consciously
bare.
In the years following Armstrong, of course, became the best-known
and most successful American cyclist ever.3 His near death from cancer in
1996, followed by his ascent to the top of the Tour podium on the Champs
d’Elysees in 1999 and again in each of the next six years, made for a come-
back story like no other. He had returned from the precipice of death
2 The most memorable fall prior to 1995, perhaps, was that of perennial Tour
runner-up Raymond Poulidor during Stage 13 of the 1973 Tour de France. Pou-
lidor crashed into an adjacent ravine, injuring his head and requiring an airlift off
the mountain. See Bill McGann & Carol McGann, The Story of the Tour de
France: 1965-2007 79 (2008); Corbis Images, Raymond Poulidor in 1973 Tour de
France, http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-photo/rights-managed/AAJA001204/
raymond-poulidor-in-1973-tour-de-france (last visited Aug. 23, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/C8JH-VU8G.
3 For an overview of Armstrong’s career at its peak, see generally Austin Murphy,
A Grand Finale, Sports Illustrated, Aug. 1, 2005; Lance Armstrong with
Sally Jenkins, It’s Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life (Putnam
2000).
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stronger, faster, and more determined. Recently, he admitted he had also
returned pharmacologically enhanced.4
Armstrong’s admission was the culmination of years of speculation and
an investigation by cycling’s governing body. In its 2012 “Reasoned Deci-
sion” announcing its findings and the sanctions it would administer, the
United States Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”) detailed Armstrong’s use of
banned drugs.5 Nearly 1,000 pages long, the report includes lurid descrip-
tions of blood stored in hidden refrigerators,6 faked engine trouble to pro-
vide cover and time for transfusions between race stages,7 injections of
variously colored unidentified substances into riders’ bodies,8 and belatedly
manufactured documentation to excuse a positive drug test.9
The report details Armstrong’s eagerness to serve as a human guinea
pig, and his expectation that his teammates would do the same, ingesting
and injecting previously untested performance-enhancing cocktails.10 Team
doctors and coaches closely monitored Armstrong’s hematocrit and lactate
levels in order to precisely adjust his drug protocol, experimenting with
substances, combinations, and dosages to find the optimal balance between
enhancement and detection.11 The anticipated benefits—increased efficiency
in carrying and processing oxygen, decreased recovery times, and, ulti-
mately, victory—took precedence over any possible side effects or long-term
harm from the drugs.
Both Casartelli’s death and Armstrong’s self-experiments bring into
high relief some of the more extreme risk of harm to which elite athletes
voluntarily expose themselves. Yet on a more mundane level, competitive
sports inevitably involve the risk of bodily harm. Training is itself a process
4 Oprah and Lance Armstrong: The Worldwide Exclusive (OWN television broadcast
Jan. 17-18, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/RW5N-9ZP8 (hereinafter “Oprah and
Lance Armstrong”). An abridged transcript of the interview is available at Lance Arm-




5 USADA v. Armstrong, Reasoned Decision of the United States Anti-Doping Agency
on Disqualification and Ineligibility (Oct. 10, 2012) (hereinafter “Armstrong Rea-
soned Decision”).
6 Id. at 61.
7 Id. at 70–71.
8 Id. at 117 & n. 639.
9 Id. at 32.
10 See id. at 6 & 59–60; see generally id. (describing Armstrong’s use, and encour-
agement and enforcement of his teammates’ use, of EPO for untested and unap-
proved enhancement purposes).
11 Id. at 100.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLS\5-1\HLS102.txt unknown Seq: 5 28-APR-14 7:44
2014 / Ignorance, Harm, and the Regulation of Substances 95
of traumatizing muscles—tearing them down in the hope that the body
rebuilds them stronger. In some sports, like boxing, causing harm to a com-
petitor is the basis of success. And continuing despite devastating injury is
the hallmark of a modern sports hero—think Kerri Strug vaulting to golden
super-stardom on a badly damaged ankle before collapsing to the mat in
agony during the 1996 Olympics.12 Regardless of the sport, the risk of grave
injury is ever-present and accepted on the elite level. Not all such risks,
though, are regulated in the same way.
Some risks are at most minimally regulated. The Col de Portet
d’Aspet, with its hazardous cement pylons and hairpin turns, has remained a
popular cycling trial and riders in more than half of the Tours de France
since Casartelli’s death have taken on its challenges. Moreover, while hel-
mets have been required in most instances in professional bicycle racing by
the sport’s governing bodies since 2003,13 outside of that context their use is
discretionary in the United States.14 The immediate risk of bodily harm—
and even death—while training or competing is just one of the trials for the
athletes to overcome, and is accepted by our laws, our athletes, the sport’s
governing bodies, and the American public.
In contrast, the perceived risk from performance-enhancing substances
is subject to intense regulation; that is, federal and state laws prohibit the
sort of self-experimentation that Armstrong undertook. While popular dis-
cussion has focused on his use of performance-enhancing substances as a
form of cheating, the laws governing this area are, perhaps surprisingly,
unconcerned with morality or fairness in the competition itself.15 Instead,
12 George Vecsey, Sports of the Times: Strug Took Her Chances For the Gold, N.Y.
Times, July 24, 1996, archived at http://perma.cc/49TQ-9SGX. Similarly, sports
sociologist Jay Coakley has noted that “a player’s willingness to compete in pain
while subjecting one’s body to danger on the field is the mark of a true athlete.” Jay
Coakley, Sport in Society: Issues and Controversies 164 (2009).
13 Press Release, Union Cycliste Internationale, Mandatory Wear of Helmets for the
Elite Category (May 5, 2003) (on file with author), http://oldsite.uci.ch/english/news/
news_2002/20030502i.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J7FU-38A2.
14 Governor’s Highway Safety Association, Helmet Laws (November 2013),
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/helmet_laws.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/9BG-WUM8.
15 Federal investigations into Armstrong focused not on whether he cheated, but
on whether he defrauded the government, trafficked drugs, laundered money, in-
timidated witnesses, and engaged in a conspiracy with respect to these possible
crimes. See Ian Austen, Inquiry on Lance Armstrong Ends With No Charges, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 4, 2012, at D1, archived at http://perma.cc/F7XR-RP9G; see also Press
Release, Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorney Closes Investigation of Professional Cycling Team,
Rel. No. 12-024 (Feb. 3, 2012)(on file with author), available at http://perma.cc/
9U4D-375G, (announcing closing of federal criminal conduct investigations into
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the legal restrictions on doping are justified as a way to prevent an unaccept-
able risk of harm from the use of unsafe substances.16 Our legal perception
of, and attitudes towards, this potential for harm—harm to the athletes like
Armstrong who choose to use performance-enhancements, to others who be-
lieve they must use them to “level the playing field,” and to the “spirit of
competition”—means the use of performance-enhancing substances is pro-
hibited, monitored, investigated, and punished in a way other potentially
harmful actions are not.
To elite athletes, though, these risks are more similar than not: they are
both just part of the game, and part of the job. These contrasting approaches
evidence a disconnect between how the law, sporting organizations, and fans
approach performance-enhancing substances, and how elite athletes do. As a
result of this disjuncture, athletes’ compliance with anti-doping regulations
and laws in at least some sports remains low,17 and any risks associated with
the use of prohibited substances are, like high speeds, hairpin turns, and
concrete pylons, simply part of an elite athlete’s day’s work. We are no
closer to eliminating the use of performance-enhancing substances in sport
than we were half a century ago when such efforts began.
This Article analyzes this gap between how legal and sporting authori-
ties, on the one hand, and elite athletes, on the other, approach, understand,
and react to the risk of harm from the use of performance-enhancing sub-
stances. Specifically, Part I explains the various tangled strands of the
United States’ legal and quasi-legal regulation of these substances. It also
exposes the staggering ignorance that this approach created and perpetuates
with respect to even the most commonly used substances. The successes and
failures of this regime are then examined in Part II, which argues that our
ignorance concerning the actual effects—both helpful and harmful—of per-
formance-enhancing substances ultimately increases demand for these sub-
stances. Part III turns to behavioral research to identify specific information
we need to successfully align the interests of athletes, sporting officials, leg-
islators, and fans in reducing the harm from doping. In addition, it outlines
some sources from which this information may be gathered effectively and
ethically with minimal modifications to existing laws and practices. The
Armstrong and his team). The Department of Justice also intervened in a lawsuit
filed by Armstrong’s former teammate Floyd Landis that alleges civil fraud viola-
tions by Armstrong and his associates. Complaint, United States ex rel. v. Tailwind
Sports Corp., No. 10-cv-0976-RLW (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2013).
16 Part I, infra, discusses the American regulation and prohibition of perform-
ance-enhancing substances.
17 Part II, infra, details and critiques our lack of success in preventing the use of
performance-enhancing substances.
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Article concludes by emphasizing the need for an approach to regulating the
use of performance-enhancing substances that is consistent with the values
and practices of elite sport, while reducing the risk of unnecessary harm.
I. REGULATING IGNORANCE
In the United States, performance-enhancing substances are not subject
to a single regulatory regime. Instead, a substance’s classification as a
“drug” or as a “supplement” determines its legal treatment. This legal
framework, then, is formally distinct from the anti-doping efforts of sport-
ing organizations, although at critical times these efforts overlap.
A. Legal Regulation of Drugs
At their most basic level, many performance-enhancing substances are
simply drugs: formulations “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitiga-
tion, treatment, or prevention of disease in man . . . [or to] affect the struc-
ture or function of the body of man.”18 As such, the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) is the federal agency tasked with overseeing their
premarket testing.19
Federal regulations for human-subjects research limit testing of drugs
to instances in which the anticipated benefits of the research to the subjects,
together with the more general importance of the knowledge expected to
result, outweigh any risk to the subjects from the research.20 This so-called
“Common Rule” applies to all research subject to federal regulation and
involving human beings.21 Fifteen federal departments and agencies have
adopted it, including the Department of Health and Human Services, which
oversees the FDA.22 Under associated regulations, an Institutional Review
Board (“IRB”) must approve any human-subjects research in advance after
18 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2009).
19 Food And Drug Adminstration , What is the Approval Process for a New Prescrip-
tion Drug?, www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/transparency/basics/ucm194949.htm, archived
at http://perma.cc/EY3U-6VZC (last visited November 5, 2013).
20 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2012).
21 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2012). Research that is at most only minimally inva-
sive is excepted. For a list of these exceptions, see 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (2012).
22 Department of Health and Human Services, Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/common
rule/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DR2N-KGMT (last visited Aug. 23,
2013).
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assessing the risks and benefits of the research.23 This approach was formu-
lated in part to ensure that the abuses of past studies were not repeated.24
The legal question in drug approvals is whether a new drug is safe and
efficacious for its intended purpose: Given the initial disease or injury the
drug is intended to treat, are the side effects and other potential risks worth
it? Does it help more than it hurts? This is an explicitly therapeutic focus, in
which drugs are used to treat a particular medical ailment and return a
patient’s body to normal functioning.25
In contrast to this approach, the use of drugs for performance-enhance-
ment is an effort to improve human functioning and performance beyond a
normal state or merely good health.26 Because no initial disease or injury is
present when enhancement rather than treatment is the goal, any risk or side
effect—an ever-present reality with drugs27—is enough to doom any pro-
posed study on human subjects.28 After all, the starting point for enhance-
23 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2012).
24 For example, in the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study, the United States Pub-
lic Health Service tracked the untreated progression of syphilis in an African-Amer-
ican community for forty years under the auspices of providing free health care.
During the course of the study, twenty men died from syphilis, more died from
syphilis-related complications, and many more passed the disease on to their part-
ners and children. For an overview of the Tuskegee study, see generally James H.
Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (1981). For the ways in
which the study impacted future human-subjects research, see Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, How Tuskegee Changed Research Practices, http://www.
cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/XT6U-F9LA (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013).
25 Gary A. Green, The Role of Physicians, Scientists, Trainers, Coaches, and Other
Nonathletes in Athletes’ Drug Use, in Performance-Enhancing Technologies in
Sports: Ethical, Conceptual, and Scientific Issues 82 (Thomas H. Murray, et al.,
eds. 2009) (hereinafter, “Performance-Enhancing Technologies”).
26 For an overview of approaches to understanding enhancements, see Eric T.
Juengst, What Does Enhancement Mean?, in Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical
and Social Implications 29 (Erik Parens, ed. 2000).
27 See, e.g., Anjan Chatterjee, Cosmetic Neurology: The Controversy Over Enhancing
Movement, Mentation, and Mood, 63 Neurology 968, 970 (2004) (“Virtually all
medications have potential side effects that range from minor inconveniences to
severe disability or death.”); cf., Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information
Prescription for Drug Regulation, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 569, 570 (2006) (noting that, in
the context of FDA approval, “ ‘[s]afe’ does not mean ‘incapable of doing harm’; all
drugs do harm.”).
28 See generally Maxwell Mehlman & Jessica Berg, Human Subjects Protections in
Biomedical Enhancement Research: Assessing Risk and Benefit and Obtaining Informed Con-
sent, 36 J. Law, Medicine & Ethics 546 (2008) (arguing that, contrary to current
assumptions and practices, enhancement research requires few protections for
human subjects beyond those accepted for therapeutic research).
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ment is normal health, not illness.29 Thus, while an IRB may deem a drug
that treats anemia but increases a user’s risk of stroke beneficial enough
given its therapeutic benefits to test as a treatment for anemia, the same risk
of stroke would be unacceptable were a manufacturer instead to propose
testing the drug to increase the blood’s oxygen-carrying capacity to improve
an athlete’s endurance.30 Whether the availability of a drug constitutes
cheating or potentially provides an unfair advantage to an athlete is not part
of the consideration in the FDA’s approval process.31 Just as American law
does not concern itself with the composition of baseball bats,32 whether a
football coach spies on opponents’ signals,33 or how much of the course a
marathoner actually runs,34 only where enhancement involves a legal of-
fense—not simply cheating—does the law involve itself.35
29 Id. at 547.
30 Synthetic erythropoietin (“EPO”), one of the drugs USADA repeatedly cited
in its case against Armstrong, offers this trade-off. See Malcolm Gladwell, Perform-
ance-Enhancing Drugs Should Be Regulated Not Prohibited, in Performance-Enhanc-
ing Drugs 56–58 (James Haley, ed., Greenhaven Press 2003).
31 Others have also noted this fact. See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We
Regulate Genetic Enhancement, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671, 701 (1999) (“[T]he
scope of FDA review is statutorily limited to safety and efficacy. It currently does
not have any statutory authority to consider . . . social problems of fairness or
cheating.”).
32 Unlike the law, sporting regulations are very concerned with such things. For
example, Major League Baseball suspended Chicago Cubs star player Sammy Sosa
for eight games in 2003 after his bat shattered in a game, revealing pieces of cork.
See Cork Screwed, CNN Sports Illustrated, (June 7, 2003), http://sportsillus-
trated.cnn.com/baseball/news/2003/06/06/sosa_suspension_ap/, archived at http://
perma.cc/RRP4-JJ55
33 In 2007, the National Football League fined Bill Belichik and the New En-
gland Patriots a combined total of $750,000 and caused the team to forfeit its 2008
first-round draft selection for videotaping the New York Jets’ defensive coaches’
signals. See NFL fines Belichick, strips Patriots of draft pick, NFL.com, (Sept. 13, 2007)
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d80251b7e/article/nfl-fines-belichick-
strips-patriots-of-draft-pick, archived at http://perma.cc/G6MQ-SBLR.
34 Race officials originally declared Rosie Ruiz the winner of the 1980 Boston
Marathon, but later disqualified her after it came to light that she had entered the
race only in the last mile. Moreover, Ruiz had qualified for the marathon based on
her performance in the 1979 New York Marathon, which was later discovered to be
another instance of cheating: Ruiz had ridden the subway for part of the distance.
See This Day in History, History.com, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/
rosie-ruiz-fakes-boston-marathon-win, archived at http://perma.cc/8S8W-QPGC
(last visited Aug. 23, 2013).
35 For example, prosecutors charged Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens with ob-
struction of justice and perjury in connection with their testimony about their use
of prohibited performance-enhancing drugs, but not for the use of the drugs them-
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As a result, neither the government nor manufacturers conduct tests to
determine whether a new drug is effective to enhance performance. Instead,
doctors, coaches, and athletes formulate enhancement protocols by extrapo-
lating from how drugs act in the tested, therapeutic context. For example,
researchers developed human growth hormone (“HGH”) to treat growth
disorders in children and hormonal deficiencies that lead to a loss of muscle
mass and decreased energy in adults.36 However athletes began using it in
the hope it would enhance their athletic performance, guessing that if HGH
increased muscle mass and decreased fatigue in individuals with naturally
low levels of the hormone, it should have the same effect on them. More
recently, the multi-billion dollar anti-aging industry has marketed it as a
fountain of youth based on similar logic.37
No testing supports these uses; instead, they rest on an assumption
that HGH will produce the same results when taken by an otherwise
healthy individual as it does when taken by someone who naturally under-
produces it.38 Similarly, researchers derive the assumed negative effects of
HGH when used for performance enhancement by extrapolating from
known effects on individuals whose bodies naturally overproduce the hor-
mone.39 It may well be, though, that it is the underproduction of HGH in the
selves. United States v. Bonds, 580 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing
perjury charge from indictment on Bonds’s motion, but denying motion to dismiss
obstruction of justice charge); United States v. Clemens, No. 10-cr-00223-RBW,
2010 WL 3260179 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2010) (indictment). See also note 15, supra R
(describing Armstrong criminal investigations). On a related point, see Matt
Hlinak, Cheating in Professional Sports and the Criminal Justice System, 9 Willamette
Sports L.J. 19 (2012) (questioning whether criminal law is correct venue for policing
sports cheating).
36 See generally Susan Cohen & Christine Cosgrove, Normal at Any Cost (Pen-
guin Group 2009) (examining the development and use of HGH).
37 In some instances these uses overlap, as seen with the “anti-aging clinic” scan-
dal in Major League Baseball. See Tim Elfrink, A Miami Clinic Supplies Drugs to
Sports’ Biggest Names, Miami New Times, (Jan. 31, 2013) http://www.miaminew-
times.com/2013-01-31/news/a-rod-and-doping-a-miami-clinic-supplies-drugs-to-
sports-biggest-names/full/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (exposing Florida anti-aging
clinic Biogenesis’s provision of HGH, testosterone, and anabolic steroids to Major
League Baseball players).
38 Ioulietta Erotokritou-Mulligan, et al., Growth Hormone Doping: A Review,
Open Access J. Sports Med. 2011:2 99–102; see also Charles E. Yesalis & Michael S.
Bahrke, Issues, Concerns, and the Future of Performance Enhancing Substances in Sport and
Exercise, in Performance-Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise 351,
352 (Michael S. Bahrke & Charles E. Yesalis, eds.).
39 See, e.g., Brian P. Brennan, et al., Human Growth Hormone Abuse in Male Weight-
lifters, 20 Am. J. on Addictions 9, 9 (2010) (“There is substantial evidence that
long-term supraphysiologic levels of HGH may cause adverse effects—as suggested
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLS\5-1\HLS102.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-APR-14 7:44
2014 / Ignorance, Harm, and the Regulation of Substances 101
first instance that makes its supplementation beneficial in the therapeutic
context.40 Simply put, it might be that only people who naturally produce
low levels of HGH respond positively to its artificial introduction. In indi-
viduals who naturally produce normal levels, the excess hormone may be
simply a waste product, just as excess vitamin C is flushed unused from the
body.41 We just don’t know.
If prescribed by a doctor, enhancement and anti-aging uses of HGH
would be “off-label”: prescribed for a use other than those for which the
drug was tested and approved. In most instances, physicians are free to write
off-label prescriptions, limited only by medical malpractice standards.42 The
use of drugs for performance enhancement is always an off-label use since
there is no testing of the drugs for this purpose, and thus no FDA approval.
Instead, enhancement is an imprecise extension of a therapeutic use of the
drug.43
For many drugs, off-label prescriptions dwarf those for approved pur-
poses. For example, approximately 90% of the prescriptions written for the
drug modafinil are off-label.44 An anti-narcolepsy drug also approved for
by studies of acromegaly, a naturally occurring disorder characterized by prolonged
supraphysiologic levels of HGH.”); Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs: Steroids
in Amateur and Professional Sports—The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid Abuse: Hear-
ings Before the H. of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 81 (April 3 &
May 9, 1989) (hereinafter “1989 Steroids Hearings”) (predicting adverse effects
of HGH use on athletes by reference to known effects of natural hyperproduction of
the hormone).
40 See Brennan et al., supra note 39, at 12 (“[T]here is little evidence that
supraphysiologic HGH produces anabolic effects in non-HGH-deficient individu-
als—although it may have such effects when used in conjunction with [anabolic
steroids] . . . .”).
41 Katherine Zeratsky, Too much vitamin C: Harmful?, The Mayo Clinic (Mar.
20, 2012), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/vitamin-c/AN01801.
42 See Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regula-
tion of Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 649, 660–76
(2011) (providing an overview of existing regulations—and the virtual lack
thereof—concerning physicians’ off-label prescribing); James T. O’Reilly, FDA and
Off-Label Drug Promotion, 1 Food & Drug Admin. 15:45 (2011) (explaining that,
once the FDA approves marketing and sale of a new drug, informal and nonstatu-
tory provisions allow individual physicians freedom to use the drug in unapproved
ways).
43 David C. Radley, et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166
Archives of Intern. Med. 1021 (2006) (finding 73% of off-label prescriptions lacked
scientific support for the use).
44 Renee A. Penaloza, et al., Trends in On-Label and Off-Label Modafinil Use in a
Nationally Representative Sample, 173 JAMA Intern. Med. 704, 704 (2013).
Modafinil is sold both as a generic drug and as “Provigil” in the United States
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obstructive sleep apnea and certain other sleeping problems, modifinil is
also a popular cognitive enhancer for students cramming for exams, surgeons
seeking to stay alert for one more procedure, and computer programmers
staying up all night on coding binges.45 These enhancement purposes are
off-label, yet pervasive and legal.
It is illegal, however, to prescribe or use certain drugs in off-label
ways.46 The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) regulates the manufacture,
importation, possession, use, and distribution of certain “controlled sub-
stances.” The CSA divides these substances into five categories or “sched-
ules” based on their characteristics. Schedule I substances are considered
unsafe for any use.47 They have no currently-accepted medical uses and a
high potential for abuse; physicians may not prescribe them at all.48 Inclu-
sion on Schedules II-V reflects the judgment that, while its off-label use is
not legitimate, the substance does have proven medical use.49
Almost all controlled substances are popular for recreational use and are
addictive, and most are narcotics, depressants, stimulants, or psychotropic
drugs.50 However, in a flurry of outrage in 1990 after their widespread use
in sports was revealed, Congress included anabolic steroids under the CSA
even though they did not fit this profile.51 As such, their off-label use is
prohibited, and their distribution, use, or possession without a prescription
for an approved purpose is a criminal offense.52 The goal is deterring use of
these drugs outside of a very narrowly conscribed medical context.
(www.provigil.com, archived at http://perma.cc/Z9XL-R9C8). While physicians
may write off-label prescriptions for it, the World Anti-Doping Agency
(“WADA”) prohibits its use by athletes. WADA, The 2013 Prohibited List S6(a),
http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-Pro-
hibited-list/2013/WADA-Prohibited-List-2013-EN.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/K5FG-L7ZB (Sept. 10 , 2012) (hereinafter “WADA Prohibited List”).
45 Penaloza, supra note 44, at 704. R
46 21 U.S.C. § 829 (2009) (setting forth requirements for prescribing controlled sub-
stances); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2013) (“A prescription for a controlled substance
. . . must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner
acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”).
47 21 U.S.C. § 812(1)(B) (2009).
48 Id. Heroin, peyote, and LSD, for example, are Schedule I substances. Id.
49 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2009).
50 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2009); Legislation to Amend the Controlled Substances
Act (Anabolic Steroids): Hearing on H.R. 3216 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. of
Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 60 (1988) (statement of
Gene Haislip) (hereinafter “1988 Steroid Hearing”).
51 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule III(e) (2012).
52 21 U.S.C. §§ 841–44 (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2013).
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In prohibiting the off-label use of anabolic steroids, Congress primarily
focused its inquiries on the drugs’ potential for harm when used for perform-
ance-enhancement, asking:
What risks are American athletes running if they take these drugs? Just
how big a problem are these drugs becoming? What is the nature of the
abuse of these drugs and how widespread has it become? What are the
current laws available to prevent this abuse and what should we be doing
to better protect athletes, young and old, from these particular drugs?53
In answer, numerous agency and medical witnesses repeatedly testified
about the lack of information on these points, and questioned whether strat-
egies other than prohibition might curtail the use of steroids for enhance-
ment purposes.54 One witness succinctly summarized the state of research
into the harmful effects of steroids when he answered his own question,
“What are the long-term health effects in otherwise healthy people? We do
not know. It is pure conjecture what is going to happen in the long-run.
That has not been studied.”55
Representatives from the American Medical Association (“AMA”),
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), FDA, and Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) unequivocally opposed including steroids under the CSA. These
agencies were unified in expressing concern over the lack of information
concerning the risk of harm from the nontherapeutic use of steroids.56 Spe-
cifically, the DOJ urged Congress to await the results of an already-commis-
sioned task force study into the use and abuse of steroids before deciding
whether to schedule them57 and the AMA stressed the folly of limiting off-
label medical uses for the drugs,58 arguing that existing data failed to
demonstrate that steroids were either physically or psychologically addic-
53 Statement of William J. Hughes (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime),
1988 Steroid Hearing, supra note 50, at 3. R
54 Statement of Dr. David L. Bever, 1988 Steroid Hearing, supra note 50, at R
54–55; Anabolic Steroid Restriction Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 995 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the H. of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
47 (1989) (statement of Dr. Charles E. Yesalis III) (hereinafter “March 1989 Ster-
oid Hearing”); Statement of Dr. David E. Katz, 1989 Steroids Hearings, supra note
39, at 56. R
55 Testimony of Dr. Charles E. Yesalis III, 1988 Steroid Hearing, supra note
50, at 42. R
56 Statement of the AMA, 1988 Steroid Hearing, supra note 50, at 91–92. R
57 Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 4658 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the H. of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 37
(1990) (statement of Leslie Southwick (DOJ)).
58 Statement of the AMA, 1988 Steroid Hearing, supra note 50, at 94. R
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tive.59 The DEA pointedly expressed concern with taking legislative action
under these circumstances, stating: “There is a great deal about the problem
that we don’t know, a great deal about the steroids themselves in terms of
their impacts, a great deal about this casual traffic and what I would refer to
as abuse of steroids—that is unknown and that we should try to dis-
cover. . . .”60 Disregarding this opposition, Congress amended the CSA to
include anabolic steroids.61 In parallel legislation, Congress also prohibited
the off-label use of HGH.62 As a result of these prohibitions, our knowledge
about the effects of anabolic steroids and HGH on healthy bodies has barely
advanced in a quarter of a century.
B. Legal Regulation of Supplements
While we know little about performance-enhancing drugs like steroids
and HGH, we know even less about supplements. The Food, Drug & Cos-
metic Act63 defines supplements as substances intended for human ingestion
that contain vitamins, minerals, herbs or other botanical products, amino
acids, enzymes, or other substances found in the human diet,64 so long as
they do not have a proven therapeutic use as a drug.65
In contrast to drugs, supplements receive very little oversight from
anyone. From a regulatory perspective, supplements are merely food.66 Like
other foods, supplements are free from the regulatory scheme that applies to
drugs, including the FDA’s testing requirements.67 Instead, they are subject
to the Dietary Supplement Health & Education Act (“DSHEA”), under
59 Statement of Dr. Edward L. Langston, 1989 Steroids Hearings, supra note
39, at 69; Statement of the AMA, 1988 Steroid Hearing, supra note 50, at 94. R
60 Testimony of Gene Haislip, 1988 Steroid Hearing, supra note 50, at 60. R
61 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule III(e) (2012) (listing anabolic steroids as a con-
trolled substance); id. at § 802(41) (defining anabolic steroids); see also Maxwell J.
Mehlman, et al., Doping in Sports and the Use of State Power, 50 St. Louis U. L.J. 15 &
Appendix A (2005) (discussing the CSA’s regulation of steroids and listing the
states that include anabolic steroids in their controlled substances acts).
62 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (2012).
63 21 U.S.C § 301, et seq.
64 21 U.S.C § 321(ff) (2009).
65 FDA Basics: Is a dietary supplement a food or a drug? Food & Drug Admin.
(Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194355.
htm, archived at http://perma.cc/686P-VP29 (“If a dietary supplement meets the defi-
nition of a drug, it is regulated as a drug.”).
66 21 U.S.C § 321(ff) (2009).
67 Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, A Drug by Any Other Name . . .?: Paradoxes in
Dietary Supplement Risk Regulation, 17 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 165, 168–69 (2006).
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which manufacturers may market them absent an affirmative showing by
the FDA that they are adulterated.68
No pre-market testing or FDA approval of supplements is required
under DSHEA; unlike drugs, the safety of supplements is assumed and effi-
cacy toward any end is not required.69 Even where the product contains a
“new dietary ingredient”, the manufacturer need only notify the FDA of its
basis for believing the ingredient to be reasonably safe.70 The FDA then
bears the burden of proving otherwise.71 In fact, the law does not require a
manufacturer even to report injuries or illnesses caused by its product unless
they are “serious.”72 As a result, manufacturers do little themselves to deter-
mine their products’ side effects, problems, or benefits73—or even to con-
firm that their products’ labeling matches the ingredients.74 This lack of
regulation of supplements perpetuates our ignorance about their effects.
Some of the better-known performance-enhancing “drugs” are actually
supplements, unproven to achieve any end but marketed as simulating the
effects of harder-to-get, more expensive, or prohibited drugs. In 1998, for
example, as Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa were in the midst of the home
68 Dietary Health & Supplement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat.
4325 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). For an in-depth discussion of
dietary supplement regulation, see generally supra note 67. R
69 See Thomas L. Schwenck & Chad D. Costley, When Food Becomes a Drug:
Nonanabolic Nutritional Supplement Use in Athletes, 30 Am. J. of Sports Med. 907,
915 (2002) (“Many supplements are marketed and promoted based on various theo-
retical benefits, often derived from limited animal studies, without any basis for
recommending their human use for specific, proven ergogenic benefits.”).
70 Andrew L.T. Green, Note, Spreading the Blame: Examining the Relationship Be-
tween DSHEA and the Baseball Steroid Scandal, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 399, 410 (2010).
71 Id.
72 Noah & Noah, supra note 67. Serious adverse events include death, life-threat- R
ening injury, inpatient hospitalization, persistent or significant disability or inca-
pacity, and congenital anomaly or birth defect, as well as medical or surgical
intervention reasonably needed to prevent one of these events. Dietary Supplement
and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.109-462, 21
U.S.C. §379aa-1(a)(2).
73 John M. Tokish, et al., Ergogenic Aids: A Review of Basic Science, Performance, Side
Effects, and Status in Sports, 32 Am. J. Sports Med. 1543, 1551 (2004); see also Ron
J. Maughan, et al., Dietary Supplements, 22 J. Sports Sci. 95, 97 (2004) (“For most
of these supplements, there are few supporting data—indeed, few experimental data
at all.”).
74 See Hans Geyer, et al., A-Z of Nutritional Supplements: Dietary Supplements, Sports
Nutrition Foods and Ergogenic Aids for Health and Performance—Part 22, 45 British J.
Sports Med. 752 (2011); Maxie Kohler, et al., Confiscated Black Market Products and
Nutritional Supplements with Non-Approved Ingredients Analyzed in the Cologne Doping
Control Laboratory 2009, 2 Drug Testing & Analysis 533 (2010).
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run race McGwire would ultimately win, an Associated Press reporter noted
the name on a brown bottle sitting in McGwire’s locker.75 When asked, a
cardiologist told the reporter that the substance marked on the bottle—
“Androstenedione”—was a testosterone precursor commonly known as
“andro”. A supplement taken by some athletes in the belief it would stimu-
late their bodies’ production of testosterone, andro’s proponents believed
that it acted as a then-legal steroid.76
Does it work? Who knows? As with other supplements, andro’s manu-
facturers performed no research into its efficacy before marketing it.77 The
minimal research that exists suggests the substance may well be just a pla-
cebo: A 2003 review summarizing four published sports medicine studies
into the effects of andro supplementation concluded the substance showed
“questionable ergogenic effects.”78 A 2004 overview of research concluded,
“the marketing of this supplement’s effectiveness far exceeds its science . . . .
No study has shown a significant ergogenic effect of any kind with andro
supplementation.”79 Despite the lack of evidence that andro does much of
anything, the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) prohibited its use
as of 199780 and the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”) followed suit
in 2004.81 Falling in line, Congress amended the CSA shortly thereafter to
75 See Special Report: Who Knew, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, http://sports.espn.go.
com/espn/eticket/story?page=steroids&num=8, archived at http://perma.cc/MPL7-
5HEZ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
76 Id.
77 Or if it was, it was not required and the results have not been published. Legal
in Baseball, CNN Sports Illustrated, Aug. 22, 1998, http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/baseball/mlb/news/1998/08/22/mcgwire_supplement/, archived at http://
perma.cc/V97N-38YJ.
78 Eric G. Boyce, Use and Effectiveness of Performance-Enhancing Substances, 16(1) J.
of Pharmacy Practice 28 (2003). See also Greg E. Bradley-Popovich & Christopher R.
Mohr, Androstenedione and Androstenediol in Sport: A Brief Review of Safety and Efficacy,
15 J. Sports Chiropractic & Rehabilitation 20 (2001) (finding mixed, and at
most minimal, effects on muscle strength from andro supplementation); Maughan,
et al., supra note 73, at 109 (“There is no evidence that androstenedione and similar R
protohormones are anabolic agents”).
79 Tokish, et al., supra note 73, at 1550. R
80 Kirk Johnson, As Drugs in Sports Proliferate, So Do Ethical Questions N. Y. Times
(1998), archived at http://perma.cc/7TAN-8CC3.
81 See The 2004 Prohibited List, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2004,
http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-Pro-
hibited-list/WADA_Prohibited_List_2004_EN.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X4
QN-T8UB (prohibiting androstadeinone as of Jan. 1, 2004).
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add andro and similar substances as Schedule III controlled substances82 and
the FDA banned its sale entirely.83
C. Regulation of Performance-Enhancing Substances in Sports
In contrast to this dual legal framework, no differentiation between the
regulation of drugs and of supplements exists for purposes of sports govern-
ance of the use of performance-enhancing substances. Instead, both are eval-
uated under identical criteria.
The primary document governing the use of performance-enhancing
substances in Olympic sports is the WADA “Prohibited List.”84 The list
includes substances that meet at least two of the following criteria: (1) en-
hancing, or having the potential to enhance, performance; (2) posing an ac-
tual or potential health risk to athletes using them; and (3) being contrary to
the spirit of sport.85 In short, those that “work” and those that harm. How-
ever, in many cases no solid evidence exists that a prohibited substance offers
any enhancement or causes any harm: Instead, presumptions stand in for
data.86
Once WADA includes a substance on the Prohibited List, athletes can
no longer take it without risking a positive drug finding and suspension
from competition. A “positive” finding can result from a laboratory test
that shows the presence of a prohibited substance in the athlete’s body or
from a “non-analytical positive”, based on circumstantial evidence of pro-
hibited drug use such as witness testimony,87 “whereabouts” violations,88 or
82 Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108–358, 118 Stat. 1661 (Oct.
22, 2004).
83 See News Release, FDA, HHS Launches Crackdown on Products Containing
Andro: FDA Warns Manufacturers to Stop Distributing Such Products (Mar. 11,
2004), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/
ucm108262.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/NL2G-S4AF.
84 WADA Prohibited List, supra note 81. United States professional sports leagues R
also have their own governing frameworks, but the specifics of each are beyond the
scope of this Article.
85 World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code Art. 4.3.1 & com-
ment to Art. 4.3.2 (2009), http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-
Doping_Program/WADP-The-Code/WADA_Anti-Doping_CODE_2009_EN.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/4VLT-W98C (hereinafter “World Anti-Doping
Code”). In addition, the Prohibited List includes substances that mask the use of
other prohibited substances. Id.
86 See Green, supra note 25, at 87; Srikumaran Melethil, Making the WADA Pro- R
hibited List: Show Me the Data, 50 St. Louis U. L.J. 75, 77 (2005).
87 Armstrong, Michelle Collins, Chryste Gaines, and Tim Montgomery were
each found to have violated anti-doping rules largely based on testimony from team-
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suspicious biological passport information.89 While an athlete may receive a
“therapeutic use exemption” to excuse the use of a prohibited substance if
he has a recognized medical need for the substance,90 athletes are strictly
liable for all substances in their bodies.91 Under this approach, either an
athlete has used an impermissible substance without advance permission,
and has thus engaged in performance enhancement, or he has not. Neither
the athlete’s intent nor his knowledge of what he ingested or a substance’s
status as prohibited, nor the actual therapeutic or enhancement effect on his
body, is relevant in declaring a positive finding.
In the United States, USADA enforces athletes’ use of substances on
the Prohibited List. Created in 2000 by Congress and receiving approxi-
mately two-thirds of its funding from the United States government,92
USADA is a quasi-governmental organization. Its responsibilities include
fulfilling American obligations under the International Convention Against
mates and team personnel. Armstrong Reasoned Decision, supra note 5; R
USADA v. Collins, AAA 30 190 00658 04 (Oct. 12, 2004); USADA v. Gaines,
CAS 2004/O/649 (Dec. 13, 2005); USADA v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645 (Dec.
13, 2005).
88 WADA requires elite athletes to file their anticipated location for every day of
the following three month period at the start of each calendar quarter, including the
exact location they will be during a 60-minute window on each day. If an athlete
fails to file the information accurately or to update it as needed, or misses three
unannounced tests in any 18-month period, he has committed a “whereabouts”
doping violation. See WADA-AMA, Doping Control, Athlete Guide (5th ed.)
(2009), http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/Anti-Doping_Community/Athlete_
Guide_2008_EN.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9T7Q-U64A.
89 An athlete’s “biological passport” is a record of his biological parameters, es-
tablished by blood and urine testing, over time. The information is used both to
target athletes with suspicious profiles for additional drug testing and as indirect
evidence of doping. See WADA-AMA, Questions & Answers on the Athlete Biological
Passport, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/Science-Medicine/Athlete-Biological-Pass-
port/Q—A-on-the-Athlete-Biological-Passport/ (last updated November 2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/Q6YW-4LNM.
90 World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 85, at Art. 4.4; see also WADA-AMA, R
Questions & Answers on Therapeutic Use Exemptions, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/Sci-
ence-Medicine/TUE/QA-on-Therapeutic-Use-Exemptions/, archived at http://perma.
cc/YDK7-EDYQ (last updated Nov. 2012) (providing detailed information on
when such exemptions are granted). If an exemption is granted, the athlete’s doping
test will be categorized as “adverse analytical finding”, but not “positive”. See infra
notes 111–16 and accompanying text for further discussion of this distinction. R
91 World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 85, at Art. 2.1.1. R
92 U.S. Anti-Doping Agency Audit Report (May 5, 2011), http://www.usada.org/ar-
audit-report, archived at http://perma.cc/9K92-JHXL.
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Doping in Sport, which obligates signatories to combat the use of banned
performance-enhancing substances.93
While the Prohibited List is a sporting—not a legal—document, ef-
forts to combat banned substances have at times led to government enforce-
ment of its prohibitions. For example, federal agents subpoenaed and seized
emails and other incriminating documents belonging to the Bay Area Labo-
ratory Co-Operative (“BALCO”) in connection with a federal criminal in-
vestigation into the company’s creation and distribution of so-called
“designer steroids” to elite athletes.94 Federal officials interviewed athletes
and team personnel about performance-enhancing drug use, and threatened
them with perjury and obstruction of justice charges if they were not truth-
ful and forthcoming.95 The agents then provided transcripts of the inter-
views and the written evidence they had accumulated to USADA for use in
its non-analytical positive drug cases against sprinters Tim Montgomery,96
Marion Jones,97 Michelle Collins,98 Alvin Harrison,99 Kelli White,100 and
93 UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport, Feb. 1, 2007,
2419 U.N.T.S. 201; see also Treasury and General Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
107-67, 115 Stat. 514, 593 (2003) (designating USADA as United States’ anti-
doping agency for Olympic and international sports competition).
94 Eleven people were sentenced in connection to the investigation. For a sum-
mary of the BALCO investigation and resulting convictions, see Paul Elias, Bonds
sentencing brings BALCO saga near a close, UT San Diego (Dec. 14, 2011) http://
www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/dec/14/bonds-sentencing-brings-balco-saga-near-
a-close/all/, archived at http://perma.cc/C2EK-Z6AU.
95 Baseball player Barry Bonds and sprinter Marion Jones were convicted and
sentenced for their statements during the BALCO hearings, and the government
threatened New York Yankees’ athletic trainer Brian McNamee with prosecution
for perjury concerning statements he made about his role in delivering performance-
enhancing drugs to athletes. See United States v. Bonds, No. 3:07-cr-73251, 2011
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2011) (sentencing memorandum: obstruction of justice); United
States v. Jones, No. S6 05-cr-01067-KMK (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 5, 2007) (sentencing
memorandum: false statements); McNamee v. Clemens, 762 F.Supp. 2d 584, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 2011).
96 USADA v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645 4-5 (Dec. 13, 2005).
97 See Anderson, et al., v. International Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1545
2 (July 16, 2010) (referring to the description of the BALCO scandal found in
USADA v. Montgomery and USADA v. Gaines with respect to Marion Jones).
98 USADA v. Collins, AAA 30 190 00658 04 (2004).
99 Press Release, USADA, U.S. Track and Field Athlete Harrison Receives Four-
Year Suspension for Participation in BALCO Drug Conspiracy (Oct. 19, 2004) (on
file with author), archived at http://perma.cc/9XZL-PM8Z.
100 Press Release, USADA, U.S. Track and Field Athlete Accepts Two-Year Sus-
pension from USADA (May 19, 2004) (on file with author), archived at http://
perma.cc/G5FE-Z5F2.
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Chryste Gaines.101 In addition, the United States Senate provided USADA
with materials prepared during the grand jury investigation into BALCO,
and IRS agent Jeff Novitsky testified against Montgomery regarding evi-
dence Novitsky accumulated in the course of the federal investigation.102
Similarly, Travis Tygart, USADA’s current CEO, participated in witness
interviews during the federal criminal case against Lance Armstrong then
spearheaded the USADA proceeding against him.103 Moreover, riders who
provided statements in connection with the criminal case against Armstrong
were potentially open to perjury charges if they provided contrary testimony
in the USADA case against him.104 Thus explicitly sporting rules are backed
at times by the force of the United States government.
D. Ignorance Through Regulation
The overlap of these legal and sporting regimes means little is actually
known about the substances commonly thought to enhance performance.
And even less is known about them as they are used by athletes: The possi-
bility that an athlete can be declared positive for doping, be publicly humil-
iated, and lose years of results based largely on witness testimony means
athletes are loath to disclose any information about their use of these sub-
stances. Even where disclosure would be in an athlete’s medical best inter-
ests, he has strong incentive to stay silent: USADA’s use of statements
Armstrong made to his doctors during his treatment for testicular cancer
concerning his use of prohibited drugs105 is a powerful message to all Ameri-
can athletes to remain silent and isolated in their use of banned sub-
stances.106 Thus, in at least some instances, athletes rely on rumors,
101 USADA v. Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649 (Dec. 13, 2005).
102 USADA v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645 at 2, 14, 16–17 (Dec. 13, 2005).
103 Letter from Robert D. Luskin, counsel to Lance Armstrong, to William Bock,
III, General Counsel of USADA, (June 8, 2012), (on file with author) archived at
http://perma.cc/PT9-ZXF5.See also Armstrong v. Tygart, No. 1:12-CV-00606,
2012 WL 26887744 (W.D. Tex. July 9, 2012) (citing concerted action by USADA,
DOJ, FBI, “and other federal law enforcement agencies” in investigating Arm-
strong); Armstrong Reasoned Decision, supra note 5, at 11 (acknowledging R
that USADA coordinated witness interviews with federal investigation).
104 However, while USADA sought evidence collected by law enforcement agen-
cies against Armstrong, the request was denied. Armstrong Reasoned Decision,
supra note 5, at 3. R
105 Id.
106 In addition, Armstrong’s professional relationship and communications with
Dr. Michele Ferrari were a cornerstone of USADA’s case. See id. at 45–53, 67–74,
77–86, & 90–106.
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anecdotes, and guesses instead of medical or other professional advice in
their use of performance-enhancements.107 And we remain ignorant as to the
actual scale, scope, nature, and effect of the use of performance-enhancing
substances.
Almost twenty-five years after Congressional hearings focused on the
dearth of actual information about anabolic steroids as performance-en-
hancers, we still lack definitive data on this point.108 Instead, our under-
standing of how these and other such substances act in a healthy human
body is primarily based on anecdotal reports of their unconfirmed, uncon-
trolled, unmonitored, and unmeasured use.109 This lack of data does not, of
course, mean that any of these substances are safe or recommended for non-
therapeutic use. Nor does it mean they are not performance-enhancing.
Rather, it simply points to a critical gap in current knowledge, a gap that is
a direct result of the existing legal and quasi-legal regimes.110 In its anxiety
107 See, e.g., Aaron C.T. Smith & Bob Stewart, Drug Policy in Sport, 27 Drug &
Alcohol Rev. 123, 146 (2008) (“[T]he policy of banning drugs has made it more
difficult for athletes to obtain medical advice that might reduce the health damage
of the drugs they are using.”).
108 See, e.g., Berno Buechel, et al., Nobody’s Innocent—The Role of Customers in the
Doping Dilemma 2 (Working Papers, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/F7L-ASQM
(“Empirical studies about doping are rare because it is very hard to collect data of a
high quality.”); Bengt Kayser & Aaron C.T. Smith, Globalisation of Anti-Doping: The
Reverse Side of the Medal, 337 BMJ 85, 87 (2008) (“Anti-doping policy has been
forged without the benefit of robust data concerning the long term health effects of
the most prevalent performance-enhancing drugs.”); Michael Shermer, The Doping
Dilemma: Game Theory Helps to Explain the Pervasive Abuse of Drugs in Cycling, Baseball
and Other Sports, 298 Scientific American 82 (2008) (“Scientific studies on the
effects of performance-enhancing drugs are few in number and are usually con-
ducted on nonathletes or recreational ones . . .”). But see Boyce, supra note 78, at 22 R
(summarizing the research that does exist).
109 See, e.g., Eradicating Steroid Use Part IV: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, 109th Cong., 60 (2005) (statement of Dr. Todd Schlifstein) (“Data on the
benefits of [steroids] is based on little scientific dat[a] and mostly self reports.”);
Mehlman, supra note 31, at 30 (noting that most data on steroid use by athletes R
consists of unconfirmed and unmeasured anecdotal reports and observational stud-
ies); Statement of Dr. Yesalis, 1989 Steroid Hearings, supra note 39, at 55 (char-
acterizing research into steroids as “anecdotes, isolated case histories or ill-conceived
research”).
110 Cf., Tokish, et al., supra note 73, at 1546 (“Because [HGH] is illegal except R
under the prescription of a physician, well-controlled studies are lacking and its
impact is largely unknown, although the rumors of its use abound throughout the
sports world.”). Similarly, Julian Savulescu has noted, “[t]here is very little rigor-
ous, objective evidence because the athletes are doing something that is taboo, ille-
gal, and sometimes highly dangerous.” Julian Savulescu, et al., Why We Should
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to show it was doing something about drugs in sport, Congress ensured we
would remain ignorant about whether, how, and at what cost these sub-
stances enhance human performance.
II. IGNORANCE AND HARM
Despite the lack of information about performance-enhancing sub-
stances, the existing legal framework could still be effective: If the laws
curtail use of the substances they prohibit without encouraging riskier be-
havior, then they avert potential harm. This is an area where over-deterrence
simply means any corresponding benefits to use are missed, while under-
deterrence means harm is potentially caused. How is it going? Are the
prohibitions preventing the use of potentially harmful performance-enhanc-
ing substances?
A. Evaluation of Current Approach
Few athletes are disqualified or suspended from competition based on
positive doping tests. For example, of nearly 9,000 pre- and post-competi-
tion doping tests performed in connection with the 2012 London Summer
Olympic Games, only 52 showed the presence of a prohibited drug.111 Of
these, only nine tests—two from a single athlete—resulted in disqualifica-
tions or exclusions from competition;112 the remainder were permitted ther-
apeutic uses of the prohibited substances.113
Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport, 38 Brit. J. Sports Med. 666, 666
(2004).
111 2012 Anti-Doping Testing Figures Report 9, WADA-AMA, http://www.wada-
ama.org/Documents/Resources/Testing-Figures/WADA-2012-Anti-Doping-Test-
ing-Figures-Report-EN.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6Q3S-2FX7 (hereinafter




toyear=2012&topic=all&search=doping, archived at http://perma.cc/F8CJ-5K6X
(last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (listing disqualification of Nadzeya Ostapchuk, Ghfran
Almouhamad, and Nicholas Delpopolo based on post-competition testing, and ex-
clusions from competition for Diego Palomeque Echavarria, Alex Schwazer, Victoria
Baranova, Hysen Pulaku, and Luiza Galiulina based on pre-competition testing;
Ostapchuk’s pre-competition test was also positive).
113 See 2012 Anti-Doping Report, supra note 111, at 8 (differentiating between R
tests showing an “adverse analytical finding”—meaning the presence of a prohib-
ited substance—and those resulting in sanctions); supra note 90 and accompanying R
text (explaining therapeutic use exemptions).
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This very low rate of positive tests, representing only one-tenth of one
percent of all samples tested, is not anomalous. Of nearly 5,000 tests per-
formed at the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, only seven resulted in a
contemporaneous finding of doping,114 and officials recorded only one dop-
ing case out of over 2,000 tests at the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics.115
More generally in 2012, WADA-accredited laboratories worldwide con-
ducted approximately 270,000 doping tests, of which only 3,190 revealed
the use of prohibited substances.116 Assuming the same percentage of these
tests represented therapeutic use exemptions as at the 2012 Summer Olym-
pics,117 only 552 tests out of the 270,000 would have revealed evidence of
doping.
To the extent the actual rate of prohibited substance use is, in fact, less
than 1%, the current system is working quite well. If this is the case, then
few athletes are doping and many of those who do dope are caught. Moreo-
ver, as testing becomes increasingly sophisticated, the rate of undetected
doping can be expected to fall even further. For example, when more sensi-
tive carbon-isotope testing is used, prohibited substances are detected at a
significantly higher rate in certain sports than under traditional testing.118
In the case of Thai weightlifters, for example, 96.2% of tested samples
showed the presence of prohibited substances, and 5.75% of the tests on
track-and-field athletes did the same.119 Thus advances in testing technology
are increasing the likelihood of detection and disqualification.
However, suspensions based on more sophisticated testing of samples
years later and non-analytical findings make it clear that actual rates of use
are, in fact, much higher than the modest number of positive tests implies.
While WADA initially tests samples immediately after procurement, it
114 Factsheet: The Fight Against Doping and Promotion of Athletes’ Health, Int’l
Olympic Committee 2 (Jan. 2013), http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reference_
documents_Factsheets/Fight_against_doping.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3QY
D-KDLP (hereinafter, “Olympic Factsheet”).
115 Id.
116 2012 Anti-Doping Report, supra note 111, at 8. This is a rate of 1.2%, which is R
the same as it was in 2011. This rate has stayed fairly constant since at least 2008.
See id. See also Alan Abrahamson, 106 Tests in All of 2012, 3 Wire Sports (July 31,
2013), http://www.3wiresports.com/?p=3855, archived at http://perma.cc/8F6A-
JEPB (interpreting and summarizing this report).
117 See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. At the London Olympics,
only 9/52, or 17.3%, of the tests that showed the presence of a banned substance
resulted in action against the athlete. See 2012 Anti-Doping Report, supra note 111, at R
9; supra note 112. R
118 See Abrahamson, supra note 116. R
119 2012 Anti-Doping Report, supra note 111, at 41–46. R
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reserves the right to retest them at a later date as well120 and has an eight-
year statute of limitations for related suspensions.121 In the international
arena, recent retests of frozen samples have resulted in retroactive disqualifi-
cations for six athletes from the 2005 World Track & Field Champion-
ships122 and four from the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics.123 These
positives represent use of substances banned at the time of competition but
for which tests were not contemporaneously available. The rate of retroactive
disqualifications can provide some guide to the rate of doping that is undis-
covered at the actual time of use, but still misses use that is not detectable
under even current tests.124
Even this retesting, though, falls short of capturing at least some sig-
nificant use. In 2013, Major League Baseball suspended Ryan Braun,125 Alex
Rodriguez,126 and twelve other players127 for the use of prohibited sub-
stances based on documentary evidence and witness testimony,  not positive
drug tests.128 This scandal was presaged by a decade by that of BALCO, in
120 World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 85, at Art. 6.5. R
121 Id. at Art. 17.
122 See Sample retests reveal 6 track & field athletes doped at ’05 worlds, Sports Illus-
trated, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/20130308/iaaf-world-champi-
onships-drug-retests.ap/, archived at http://perma.cc/EMA9-NYN7 (Mar. 8, 2013)
(reporting retests of frozen samples within the eight-year statute of limitations).
123 See IOC strips 4 medals from 2004 Games, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/olympics/
story/_/id/8714605/ioc-strips-4-medals-2004-athens-olympics-postpones-decision-
lance-armstrong, http://perma.cc/6AF8-23XM (Dec. 5, 2012).
124 One anecdotal report places use as high as 95%. Andrea Petroczi, et al., Com-
fort in Big Numbers: Does Over-Estimation of Doping Prevalence in Others Indicate Self-
Involvement, 3 J. Occupational Med. & Toxicology 19, 20 (2008); see also Car-
negie Research Institute, International Literature Review: Attitudes, Behaviors, Knowl-
edge and Education—Drugs in Sport: Past, Present and Future, WADA 19-20 (2007)
(reporting athletes’ estimates of banned substance use by others at 6%-72%).
125 Press Release, Major League Baseball, Milwaukee’s Ryan Braun suspended
(July 22, 2013), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20130722
&content_id=54364310.
126 Press Release, Major League Baseball, Yankees’ Rodriguez disciplined (Aug.
5, 2013), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20130805&con-
tent_id=55963494.
127 Press Release, Major League Baseball, Discipline issued in Biogenesis investi-
gation (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=
20130805&content_id=55962130 (listing Antonio Bastardo, Everth Cabrera,
Francisco Cervelli, Nelson Cruz, Fautino De Los Santos, Sergio Escalona, Fernando
Martinez, Jesus Montero, Jordan Norberto, Jhonny Peralta, Cesar Puello, and
Jordany Valdespin).
128 Brian Costa, Drug Suspension Hits A-Rod, 12 Others, Wall St. J., Aug. 5,
2013, at A3, archived at http://perma.cc/R9AQ-YB7W. In fact, only three players
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which comprehensive performance-enhancement over a period of years went
undiscovered under USADA’s regular testing regimen.129 Moreover, Lance
Armstrong famously, repeatedly, and correctly130 pointed out that he never
failed the hundreds of drug tests (including retests131) he took,132 prior to
confessing his use in 2012.133 Instead, Armstrong’s suspension for his use of
prohibited performance-enhancing substances, and those of his former team-
mates who confessed their own use in providing evidence against him,134
resulted from circumstantial and testimonial evidence.
linked to Biogenesis tested positive for banned substances: Melky Cabrera, Bartolo
Colon, and Yasmani Grandal. James Wagner, Gio Gonzalez won’t be suspended in Bio-
genesis investigation, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 2013, archived at http://perma.cc/T9JB-
VTHC. While one of Braun’s urine samples did show the presence of testosterone in
2011, he was successful in appealing the associated suspension. The 65-game sus-
pension he accepted in June 2013 relied on a nonanalytical positive, not a positive
drug test. Steve Eder, For Rodriguez, Suspended Animation: 12 Other Players Agree Not
to Fight M.L.B. Punishment, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2013, at B8, archived at http://
perma.cc/GB2N-NVHR.
129 For further discussion of BALCO, see supra notes 94–102, and accompanying R
text.
130 Armstrong did have an adverse analytical finding with respect to cortisone,
but it was excused (and thus not a positive test) under a therapeutic use exception.
See Armstrong Reasoned Decision, supra note 5, at 31–33; supra note 90 (con- R
cerning therapeutic use exceptions); supra notes 111–113 and accompanying text R
(explaining distinction between adverse analytical findings and positive tests).
131 While six frozen samples from the 1999 Tour de France allegedly belonging
to Armstrong tested positive for EPO upon retesting years later, they were never
formally identified as his and were not considered positive tests because no second
sample was available to confirm the preliminary findings. L’Equipe story accuses Arm-
strong of 1999 EPO use, Tour de France Blog (Aug. 23, 2005), http://www.tdf-
blog.com/2005/08/lequipe_story_a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q5K5-RZ3D.
132 See, e.g., Lance Armstrong, Twitter (May 19, 2011 4:37 P.M.), https://twit-
ter.com/lancearmstrong/status/71358750434402306, archived at http://perma.cc/
Q6UB-VTG8 (“20+ year career, 500 drug controls worldwide, in and out of com-
petition. Never a failed test. I rest my case.”). In connection with his suit against
USADA, Armstrong initially asserted that he had “passed every drug test ever ad-
ministered to him in his career—a total of 500 to 600 tests,” Jury Demand, Arm-
strong v. USADA, Civ. Action No. 1:12-CV-00606, at 3 (W.D. Tex.) (July 9,
2012). The next day, though, he withdrew this assertion. See Jury Demand, Arm-
strong v. USADA, Civ. Action No. 1:12-CV-00606 (W.D. Tex.) (July 10, 2012)
(omitting the assertion).
133 Oprah and Lance Armstrong, supra note 4. R
134 USADA suspended Michael Barry, Tom Danielson, George Hincapie, Levi
Leipheimer, Christian Vande Velde, and David Zabriskie for six months and erased
numerous results for each athlete based on their confessions during the course of the
Armstrong investigation. See Six former Armstrong USPS teammates receive bans from
USADA, Cycling News, http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/six-former-arm-
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Moreover, even WADA’s own research suggests that the use of prohib-
ited substances is commonplace in at least the world of elite track and field
competitors.135 The as-yet-unpublished study,136 comprised of an anony-
mous survey completed by more than 2,000 athletes, revealed that 29% of
the competitors at the 2011 World Championships and 45% at the 2011
Pan-Arab Games were willing to admit to doping during the prior year.137
Due to predictable self-reporting issues, the researchers concluded that the
actual rate of doping most likely exceeded these figures.138 In combination
with the results of testing, retesting, and testimonials concerning use, this
research shows that enhancement—attempted or actual—is pervasive on the
elite level of at least some high-level sports.
B. Ignorance Increases Athletes’ Use of Performance-Enhancing Substances139
Not only is the current approach to the regulation of performance-
enhancing substances ineffective in preventing use of these substances in at
least some sports, ignorance concerning purported performance-enhancing
substances increases athletes’ attempts at enhancement for four reasons. First,
athletes misjudge the objective benefits and costs they can expect to experi-
ence from their use of performance-enhancing substances in systematic and
predictable ways. Second, athletes overestimate rates of use by their compet-
strong-usps-teammates-receive-bans-from-usada, archived at http://perma.cc/3RJY-
V453 (last updated Oct. 10, 2012).
135 See Tim Rohan, Study Revealing Doping in Track Strikes Hurdle, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 23, 2013, at A1, archived at http://perma.cc/C2MG-22UW (revealing the exis-
tence of the study and summarizing its findings).
136 While WADA initially encouraged publication of the study, in March 2013
it directed the researchers to delay publishing the results. Id.
137 Id. To protect athletes’ anonymity, researchers asked participants to think of a
birthday. If it occurred during the months of January through June, the participant
simply indicated so. If it occurred in the latter half of the year, participants were
asked to answer “yes” or “no” to the question: “Have you knowingly violated anti-
doping regulations by using a prohibited substance or method in the past 12
months?” Only the individual athlete knew which question he was answering, and
the researchers then used statistical analysis to estimate the overall rate of admitted
doping by the athletes at the event. Id.
138 Rohan, supra note 135. R
139 Game theory analyses of doping similarly conclude that the current
regulatory approach increases athletes’ use of performance-enhancing substances but
for other reasons. See, e.g., Gunnar Breivik, Doping Games: A Game Theoretical
Exploration of Doping, 27 Int’l Rev. Soc. Sport 235, 237 (1992) (finding that
athletes experience a “prisoner’s dilemma” with respect to doping); Buechel, et al.,
supra note 108 (focusing on role of “customers” such as media and fans in increasing R
doping by athletes).
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itors and adjust their own use upwards correspondingly. Third, athletes take
substances they believe have ergogenic benefits but which in fact do not
enhance performance. Finally, prohibition itself increases the desirability of
the prohibited substances.
1. Athletes’ calculations of costs and benefits are skewed
Analyses of athletes’ use of performance-enhancing substances assume
athletes engage in a rational decision-making process when evaluating
whether to dope.140 Under this approach, athletes are assumed to weigh the
benefits of use, such as faster times clocked, greater weights lifted, and an
improved chance of victory, against the costs, including unwanted side ef-
fects and long-term damage to health, difficulty in procuring the substances,
the probability of detection, and the expected punishment for detection. In
their efforts to decrease doping and the harm from doping, legislators, com-
mentators, and sporting organizations focus on manipulating the cost side of
the equation. In some proposals, the costs are increased in the belief that
rational athletes will then choose not to dope.141 These include improving
the quantity and sophistication of tests;142 making prohibited substances
harder to obtain with harsher penalties for their sale, possession, or use;143
140 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Prometheus: Some Ethical, Economic, and
Regulatory Issues of Sports Doping, 57 Duke L.J. 1725, 1736 (2008) (“[L]et B be the
benefit from violating a rule, P (smaller than 1) the probability that the violation
will be detected and punished, and S the sanction for the violation; then PS is the
expected cost of the sanction to the violator, and it must exceed B (PS>B) to deter
the violation.”); Peter Strelan & Robert J. Boeckmann, Why Drug Testing in Elite
Sport Does Not Work: Perceptual Deterrence Theory and the Role of Personal Moral Beliefs,
36 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 2909 (2006) (refining a rational choice model of
decision-making concerning doping); see also Joshua Whitman, Winning at All Costs:
Using Law and Economics to Determine the Proper Role of Government in Regulating the Use
of Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Professional Sports, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 459 (em-
ploying rational choice model).
141 Judge Posner, though, has noted that unless they are completely effective,
testing and other anti-doping efforts may result in increased doping; since the mea-
sures deter some athletes, the expected benefits to use for undeterred athletes—the
difference between their performance and that of their clean competitors—increase.
Posner, supra note 140, at 1737. R
142 See, e.g., Shermer, supra note 108 (proposing increased and better testing). But R
see Jay Coakley, supra note 12, at 182 (2009) (calculating the cost of effective testing R
for United States athletes at billions of dollars annually).
143 See, e.g., Drug Penalties to Stiffen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2013, at B12, archived
at http://perma.cc/CMU4-KFYD (reporting IAAF’s increase in suspensions from
two years to four for serious doping offenses); Shermer, supra note 108 (proposing R
increased penalties for positive tests, including suspensions of entire teams for a
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and providing explicit governmental oversight of anti-doping to better en-
sure compliance.144 Alternatively, some commentators have proposed adjust-
ing the cost side of the equation by eliminating the current prohibitions on
the athletic use of substances145 or increasing the oversight of athletes’ use of
substances to reduce any resulting harm.146 In each case, though, the propos-
als assume the benefits, side effects, and long-term effects of the substances
themselves are well-known constants.
Even if this assumption were correct, simply manipulating the costs
associated with enhancement may well prove unsuccessful in deterring the
use of banned substances because individuals’ decision-making often departs
from rational-choice models due to the intervention of cognitive biases.147
Primary among these is an optimism bias: Individuals typically believe they
are more likely to experience positive results and less likely to experience
negative results, both compared to the actual likelihood of experiencing
those results generally148 and as compared to other members of their peer
single member’s violation of doping rules). This appeared to be Congress’s focus
when it classified anabolic steroids and andro as controlled substances. See supra
notes 50–62 (discussing the addition of these substances to the CSA). R
144 See Shayna M. Sigman, Are We All Dopes? A Behavioral Law and Economics
Approach to Legal Regulation of Dobping in Sports, 19 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 125
(2008).
145 See Bengt Kayser, et al., Current Anti-Doping Policy: A Critical Appraisal, 8
BMC Med. Ethics 2 (2007); Bengt Kayser & Barbara Broers, The Olympics and Harm
Reduction, 9 Harm Reduction J. 33 (2012); Savulescu, et al., supra note 110; Wil-
liam Spencer Topham, Muscle Melee: Redefining Anabolic Steroid Policy in a Post-“Great
Recession” Economy, 7 Willamette Sports L.J. 44, 49 (2010). But see Thomas S.
Petersen & Johannes K. Kristensen, Should Athletes Be Allowed to Use All Kinds of
Performance-Enhancing Drugs?—A Critical Note on Claudio M. Tamburrini, 26 J. Phi-
losophy of Sport 88 (2009) (arguing against lifting the ban on performance-enhanc-
ing drugs in sport).
146 See, e.g., Ken Kirkwood, Considering Harm Reduction as the Future of Doping
Control Policy in International Sport, 61 Quest 180 (2009) (suggesting increased
medical supervision of athletes’ doping); Whitman, supra note 140 (recommending R
that federal government develop comprehensive drug management strategies for
doping in professional sports).
147 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979). For an analysis of the role of cognitive
biases in athletes’ decision-making concerning competing contract offers, see
Michael McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and
Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1501 (2006).
148 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1091
(2000).
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group.149 Thus, with respect to doping, many athletes likely overestimate
the likelihood that their performances are enhanced, and underestimate the
likelihood of being caught or incurring long-term harm.
Further tipping the equation, examples of enhancement successes are
more readily available than those of enhancement failures. For this, “suc-
cess” can be understood as the times an athlete uses a performance-enhanc-
ing substance and becomes more successful, while a “failure” occurs when
an athlete uses a substance in order to enhance performance, but the sub-
stance fails to deliver: there is no associated improvement in performance
benefit, it causes harm equal to or greater than any benefit it provides, or
performance declines with use.
Lance Armstrong,150 Tyson Gay,151 Ryan Braun,152 and Alex Rodri-
guez153 are all highly visible examples of enhancement successes: Athletes
who are known to have used performance enhancing substances and reached
the top of their sports. Even in the absence of direct evidence of doping,
though, we often assume that record-breaking performances are examples of
successful enhancement. For example, sixteen-year-old Chinese swimmer Ye
Shiwen became the subject of speculation concerning doping after swim-
ming the final fifty meters of the women’s 400-meter Individual Medley at
the 2012 Summer Olympics faster than American Ryan Lochte did in win-
ning the men’s race.154 While Shiwen may have used as-yet undetectable but
prohibited substances—testing cannot conclusively prove lack of doping—
there is currently no analytical, testimonial, or documentary evidence that
she did so.155 Instead, the speculation rests solely on her record-breaking
performance. Contrary to the schoolyard taunt, we assume that winners
often cheat, and cheaters often win.
At the same time, enhancement failures are largely invisible. Athletes
who experience unwanted side effects from the use of a prohibited substance
are unlikely to complain because admitting to side effects from doping is
admitting to doping itself. Even when an athlete is known to have taken
performance-enhancing substances, evidence of physical injury from the use
149 Cass Sunstein, Selective Fatalism, 27 J. Legal Stud. 799, 807 (1998).
150 See supra notes 5–9, and accompanying text. R
151 See infra note 174. R
152 See supra notes 125 & 128. R
153 See supra notes 127 & 128. R
154 See Erik Niiler, Olympic Doping Scandal Over Chinese Swimmer Grows, Discov-
ery, (Aug. 1, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://news.discovery.com/adventure/extreme-sports
/ye-shiwen-doping-scandal-olympic-swimming-120801.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/6CBZ-UAGQ.
155 Id.
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is often lacking: Athletes suspended for doping are generally at the top of
their game and, while some may appear over-developed, few appear to be
suffering from ill health.
Public evidence of long-term harmful effects is also thin. While Arnold
Schwarzenegger has spoken openly about his use of anabolic steroids
throughout the 1970s,156 Terry Bollea (better known as Hulk Hogan) testi-
fied that he used steroids during the 1980s,157 and Mark McGwire admitted
using steroids and HGH in the 1990s,158 all appear to be aging normally.
Only in rare cases do athletes suffering from ill health associated with the
use of performance-enhancing substances publicly reveal their use and symp-
toms. One such example is former professional football player Lyle Alzado,
who attributed his brain cancer to his use of steroids and human growth
hormone.159 At the time of his use, however, the National Football League
did not ban these substances so there was no cost—in terms of lost legacy,
stripped titles, or suspensions—to the revelations. Moreover, at least one
expert publicly questioned whether the substances Alzado used could even
have caused the type of cancer he had,160 undermining any clear connection
between these substances and the harm suffered by Alzado.
Athletes who use prohibited substances but fail to reach the highest
level of their sport are equally unlikely to disclose their use, and far less
likely to be tested. After all, drug testing is heavily concentrated at the
upper end of the athletic hierarchy: In each event of the 2012 Summer
Olympics, for example, only the top five finishers and two randomly se-
lected athletes were drug tested.161 That means that in an event like the
2012 Olympic men’s 100-meter sprint where there were 75 competitors,
there was less than a 3% chance that the athletes finishing sixth place or
156 Tom Farrey, Conan the Politician, ESPN (Nov. 17, 2003), http://espn.go.com/
columns/farrey_tom/1655597.html.
157 Hulk Hogan, On Witness Stand, Tells of Steroid Use in Wrestling, N.Y. Times,
July 15, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/15/nyregion/hulk-hogan-on-wit-
ness-stand-tells-of-steroid-use-in-wrestling.html.
158 McGuire Apologizes to La Russa, Selig, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2010, 2:01 PM) http://
sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4816607, archived at http://perma.cc/LT7
G-ZVYK.
159 Lyle Alzado, I’m Sick and I’m Scared, 75 Sports Illustrated 20 (July 8,
1991), available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG
1139729/index.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/QG9U-VUGU.
160 Bigger Stronger Faster* (Mad Men Films 2008) (including statements of Dr.
Norm Fost to that effect).
161 Olympic Factsheet, supra note 114, at 1. R
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lower were tested.162 This includes, for example, Jamaican Asafa Powell who
finished in eighth place in the event and, less than a year later, tested posi-
tive for a banned stimulant at the Jamaican National Trials.163 Out-of-com-
petition tests are even less frequent and similarly focused on the top
athletes.164 Thus, the chance a middle of the field elite athlete will test
positive and have his use of a prohibited substance revealed is low, so no
counterexamples weaken the connection between enhancement and athletic
success. Instead, the absence of information about enhancement failures—or
even enhancement successes that do not achieve super-stardom—dilutes the
limited clinical evidence that exists concerning the physical costs of per-
formance-enhancing substances.
This asymmetry makes athletic success seem inevitably a product of
enhancement, and enhancement a necessary component of athletic success.
Because individuals overweigh outcomes they consider certain relative to
those they consider merely possible,165 this consistent and strong association
between athletic success and the use of performance-enhancing substances,
especially paired with the invisibility and uncertainty of enhancement fail-
ures, causes athletes to miscalculate the relative benefits and costs of en-
hancement. This miscalculation then magnifies the effect of the optimism
bias.
The difference in timing between the realization of enhancement bene-
fits and any costs further unbalances the equation. Christine Jolls, Cass Sun-
stein, and Richard Thaler analyze the limitations that bounded willpower
impose on decision-making: Even when individuals know there are long-
term negative consequences to an action, they still often pursue it to achieve
a lesser short-term pay-off.166 This effect is greater where there is a close
association between an action and a short-term gain, but an unclear relation-
162 See London 2012 Athletics, 100m Men, Olympic.org (2013), http://www.
olympic.org/olympic-results/london-2012/athletics/100m-m, archived at http://
perma.cc/CM55-CG9N.
163 Id.; see also Statement from Asafa Powell, Asafa Powell, http://www.iamasafa.
com/asafa-scoop/statement-from-asafa-powell/, archived at http://perma.cc/ST8F-D
Q4F.
164 See Alan Abrahamson, Most drug-tested: Ryan Lochte, 3 Wire Sports (July
27, 2013), http://www.3wiresports.com/2013/07/27/most-drug-tested-ryan-lochte/,
archived at http://perma.cc/L3ZA-AHYC (critiquing data concerning out of compe-
tition drug tests of swimming and track and field athletes).
165 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 147, at 265 (labeling this a “certainty R
effect”).
166 Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1471, 1479 (1998).
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ship to the long-term harm.167 Thus, in the context of the studied criminal
behavior, potential offenders often behaved contrary to expectations because
of the time lapse between when they realized the near-term benefits of a
crime and some indefinite point in the future when they may incur costs.168
The result is that the potential costs involved with a chosen course of action
are discounted—at times dramatically—because of the degree of self-control
necessary to forego short-term gains for long-term losses.
Similarly, athletes generally realize any benefits of enhancement rather
quickly. Assuming a substance is effective, an athlete who uses it might win
a race, gain strength, or set a record in the minutes, days, or months after
use. The costs, though, are often delayed, even if ultimately realized: While
stimulant use in a competition at which the athlete is tested likely will lead
to swift consequences, non-analytic positives and long-term negative health
effects come to light only after the passage of often-significant time, if ever.
The combination of these effects means that athletes misjudge the ob-
jective benefits and costs they can expect to experience from their use of
performance-enhancing substances in predictable ways. Without research
into the effects specific substances have on performance, there is no objective
data available to correct the resulting mistaken weights assigned the various
benefits and costs of enhancement. In other words, in the absence of infor-
mation, we can expect athletes to overestimate the helpfulness of perform-
ance-enhancing substances and underestimate both their harmfulness and
the possibility of detection.
2. Overestimations of rates of use lead to increased use
While athletes’ use of performance-enhancement substances is often
understood as an attempt to beat the competition, even high-profile athletes
caught for doping often cite their use as a way merely to “level the playing
field” with competitors they believe are doing the same thing.169 While it
may be tempting to dismiss such explanations as convenient rationaliza-
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1538.
169 Among others, Lance Armstrong and Ben Johnson (who was stripped of an
Olympic gold medal after testing positive for a steroid at the 1988 Olympic Games)
have claimed doping was commonplace in their sports. See Oprah and Lance Arm-
strong, supra note 4 (Armstrong); Athletics still ‘all corrupt’ claims Ben Johnson, BBC R
Sport, http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/athletics/8798855.stm, archived at http://
perma.cc/KXE7-FWPD (last updated July 8, 2010) (Johnson). See also Roger Gard-
ner, On Performance-Enhancing Substances and the Unfair Advantage Argument, 16 J.
Phil. Sport 59 (1989) (examining the unfair advantage argument against
enhancement).
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tions, ignorance concerning actual rates of use of banned substances may
result in athletes’ overestimations of these rates. These overestimations, in
turn, influence athletes otherwise undecided whether to use prohibited sub-
stances to do so.170
When judging the likely frequency of an event, individuals employ
heuristics—mental shortcuts—to ease the task.171 One commonly employed
shortcut is the availability heuristic: Because large classes of associated
events are easier and quicker to recall than smaller classes, individuals often
estimate the frequency of an event by how easy it is to think of relevant
examples.172 This approach can be rational where ease of recollection is, in
fact, associated with frequency of occurrence, but it leads to mistakes in
logic when other factors, like the publicity given to one set of outcomes
instead of another, affect recall.173
In many sports, examples of athletes known to use performance-en-
hancing substances are easy to call to mind. The impossibility of proving an
athlete is definitively clean, though, makes it much more difficult to name
with any degree of certainty athletes who have never used a performance-
enhancing substance: Today’s clean athlete may well be tomorrow’s doper.174
However, the relative ease of identifying examples does not reveal the actual
frequency of doping.
170 See Jaime Morente-Sanchez & Mikel Zabala, Doping in Sport: A Review of Elite
Athletes’ Attitudes, Beliefs, and Knowledge, 43 Sports Medicine 395, 398 (2013)
(citing studies showing that athletes’ decisions to take prohibited substances is in-
fluenced by a belief that their competitors are doing so); Thomas H. Murray, Drugs,
Sport, and Ethics, in Analyzing Moral Issues 317 (Judith Boss, ed., 2004) (argu-
ing that many athletes take steroids only because they believe others do the same).
171 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, 5 Cog. Psych. 207, 207 (1973).
172 Id.
173 See id. at 208–09.
174 For example, sprinter Tyson Gay was one of eleven athletes who signed
USADA’s “My Victory” pledge. See Athletes, My Victory, http://www.usada.org/
MyVictory/athletes/, archived at http://perma.cc/932Y-H74J (last visited Oct. 8,
2013). The pledge states, in relevant part, “The only sport I believe in is clean
sport, sport that is free of all cheating, including doping.” Take the Pledge!, My
Victory, http://www.usada.org/MyVictory/take-pledge/, archived at http://perma.
cc/Y58M-A9KT (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). As part of the pledge, Gay promised to
always compete clean. Id. In May 2013, he tested positive for a prohibited substance
at an out-of-competition test and has been reported to have tested positive addi-
tional times during competition. Report: Tyson Gay failed drug test at Nationals,
Sports Illustrated, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/20130726/tyson-
gay-drug-tests-u-s-nationals.ap/index.html (last updated July 26, 2013).
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The narratives of athletes who have been caught using performance-
enhancing substances are often highly salient, contributing to this bias.175
For example, Armstrong’s personal story of near death from cancer followed
by repeated success in one of the world’s most grueling competitions is well-
known inside and outside of bicycle racing circles. His many denials, the
surrounding drama and lawsuits, and the use of experimental cocktails to
fuel his miraculous turnaround only increase the memorability of the story.
The sensationalism of Armstrong’s account does not make it more
likely that other athletes dope than if he was simply a successful rider who
had tested positive for drugs with little fanfare. Yet for an athlete deciding
whether to use a performance-enhancing substance, the easy recall of Arm-
strong’s story, paired with the lack of verifiable examples of clean athletes
and ignorance concerning the actual rates of doping in sport, means the
athlete is more likely to overestimate the frequency of use than to underesti-
mate it. This overestimation has a domino effect on use rates: it increases the
likelihood that the athlete will use the banned substance himself, both as a
way to fit into the sporting culture176 and to compete on equal terms with
his competitors who he believes are doping. With this increased use, other
athletes then have more examples to draw on in making their own decisions
concerning doping, increasing the likelihood they too will choose to
enhance.
3. Lack of information about unergogenic effects increases risk-taking
Some individuals most likely forego the use of performance-enhancing
substances because of the uncertainty about the physical side effects and
possible long-term harm from use. However, sport itself is a physically risky
activity,177 and elite athletes repeatedly demonstrate their disregard for the
many associated bodily risks.178 For elite athletes the risk of physical harm is
normalized. As a result, vague warnings concerning possible side effects and
175 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1127 (1974) (finding that salience increases the
retrievability of instances, strengthening availability bias).
176 Jay Coakley terms this desire by athletes to conform even to harmful norms as
“deviant overconformity.” Coakley, supra note 12, at 155–56. R
177 See, e.g., Kevin Young, Violence, Risk and Liability in Male Sports Culture, 10
Soc. of Sport J. 373 (1993) (noting that rates of injury in men’s professional contact
sports are often higher than those at construction sites, oil-drilling rigs, or under-
ground mines).
178 Smith & Stewart, supra note 107, at 126 (noting that male athletes show a R
propensity toward high risk experiences). In fact, even where athletes are informed
of the known side effects and possible health risks from the use of medications, their
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the risk of long-term physical harm can be expected only to minimally affect
athletes’ decision-making.179 As Cass Sunstein explained in the context of
the tendency by individuals to treat certain risks as “background noise”
while worrying a great deal about quantitatively identical risks, “For people
immersed in a particular culture, it is hard to even see the relevant risks as
such.”180
The little data that does exist about the risk of harm from the use of
performance-enhancing substances rarely includes information about the
harm that might be expected to most heavily influence athletes’ decision-
making: the risk that a substance will impede performance. Even when in-
formation about nonergogenic effects of commonly used performance-en-
hancing substances is available, popular culture fails to afford it the same
prominence as reports of potential ergogenic effects. For example, while it is
well-known that Mark McGwire used andro during his homerun record-
setting year,181 findings that andro increases the natural production of es-
trogen and decreases the body’s own production of testosterone,182 thereby
perhaps impeding performance, have received much less publicity. The in-
visibility of this negative information, even when it exists, means it does not
inhibit risk-taking by athletes.
4. Prohibition itself increases desirability
In many instances, simply prohibiting substances increases demand for
them.183 For athletes, three factors contribute to this phenomenon: (1) an
erroneous assumption that only substances that enhance performance are
banned; (2) psychological reactance; and (3) a placebo effect. As a result,
attitudes concerning the use remain unchanged. Morente-Sanchez & Zabala, supra
note 170, at 405.
179 Willy Voet, soigneur for former professional bicycle racing team Festina, re-
counted that “all some of the riders wanted was to become guinea-pigs for new
kinds of doping.” Willy Voet, Breaking the Chain: Drugs and Cycling: The
True Story 105 (Yellow Jersey Press 2002).
180 Sunstein, supra note 149, at 805. R
181 See Special Report: Who Knew, supra note 75, and accompanying text. R
182 Tokish, supra note 73, at 1550. R
183 This effect can be seen outside the sporting world as well: Alcohol consump-
tion in the United States increased during Prohibition, both in terms of quantity
and strength of alcohol consumed. In addition, both glue-sniffing and dropping
acid increased greatly in popularity after publicity campaigns warned of injury and
laws were passed against the practices. Edward M. Brecher, et al., Licit and Illicit
Drugs 321–33 & 368–89 (Consumers Union 1972).
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prohibiting a substance’s use without evidence of any ergogenic effect184
may well increase the demand for that substance—and any harm it might
cause—without actually decreasing enhancement itself.
First, athletes understand prohibitions against the use of certain sub-
stances as implicit acknowledgements that the substances enhance perform-
ance.185 That non-athletes may freely use many prohibited substances and
doctors may prescribe others for medical purposes reinforces this perspective:
If the substances were really so unsafe, surely they would be impermissible
for everyone’s use? One logical interpretation for the athletic prohibition,
then, is that the banned substance “works”—it enhances performance.186
For some individuals, prohibition may create an even stronger incen-
tive. Instead of mistakenly extrapolating efficacy from prohibition, they af-
firmatively seek out items they can’t have simply because they can’t have
them. Here, the loss of a previous behavioral freedom motivates an individ-
ual’s desire to restore it.187 To the extent he believes the loss is illegitimate
or unjustified, an individual will experience this “psychological reactance”
more strongly.188 The implications in the context of performance-enhancing
substances are clear: Prohibiting a formerly permissible substance can be
expected to engender a reaction in favor of the substance, which will be
greater in magnitude if the prohibition seems illegitimate. Thus, adding
substances to the prohibited list without providing legitimizing data may
well prove counterproductive by making athletes more inclined to seek out
the substances to reassert their freedom.
184 See supra notes 46–60 & 86, and accompanying text, critiquing the processes R
by which Congress and WADA have prohibited the use of potentially enhancing
substances.
185 Melethil, supra note 86, at 87 (“The mere listing of a substance or method R
. . . is misinterpreted by most athletes that the substance or method offers an advan-
tage. The logic simply is: If a substance or method does not offer an advantage, why
would WADA put it on the list?”).
186 Id. This problem extends beyond athletes: Because there is little to no polic-
ing of performance-enhancing substances in the United States outside the context of
elite sport, recreational athletes assume the substances banned in elite competition
will improve their conditioning and physique with no realistic repercussions. As a
result, the use of performance enhancing substances in society generally seems to be
increasing. See Kayser & Smith, supra note 108, at 86. R
187 Jack W. Brehm, Control, Its Loss, and Psychological Reactance, in Control Mo-
tivation and Social Cognition 3, 15 (G. Weary, et al., eds., Springer-Verlag 1993).
See also Jack W. Brehm, et al., The Attractiveness of an Eliminated Choice Alternative, 2
J. Experimental Soc. Psych. 301 (1966) (finding this phenomenon only where the
choice was originally available, then later removed).
188 Jack W. Brehm, A Theory of Psychological Reactance 7–9 (Academic
Press 1966).
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Moreover, in the absence of contrary evidence, this association between
prohibition and enhancement means that nonergogenic substances may ac-
tually produce a placebo effect in users, encouraging further use.189 Re-
searchers have at times attempted to disentangle the actual and perceived
ergogenic effects of performance-enhancing substances by measuring their
placebo effects. One early study focusing on anabolic steroids found that
competitive weightlifters who took pills they thought were steroids got
stronger than the athletes in a control group, even though both groups were
given placebos.190 In another study comparing the effects of positive and
negative information about a substance on performance, researchers ran-
domly assigned participants to two groups.191 Each participant completed a
timed sprint workout before taking a gelatin capsule filled with corn-
starch.192 Researchers told one group that the substance was likely to im-
prove performance, and the other that it was likely to negatively impact
performance.193 Twenty minutes later, the participants repeated the sprint
workout.194 Members of the first group did the same or better than in the
baseline test, and members of the second group did worse.195 This shows
that the effect an athlete ascribes to a substance affects his physical response
to it, independent of the substance’s actual biological effect.196 Thus, what
athletes believe about a substance—whether they believe it helps or hurts
189 See Tokish et al., supra note 73, at 1550 (“A critical review of the literature R
reveals that substances that . . . are even perceived to improve performance[ ] are
widely used by athletes.”). See also Christopher J. Beedie, et al., Positive and Negative
Placebo Effects Resulting from the Deceptive Administration of an Ergogenic Aid, 17 Int’l
J. Sport Nutrition & Exercise Metabolism 259, 266 (2007) (finding that approxi-
mately 35% of the United States’ population is placebo-responsive).
190 Gideon Ariel & William Seville, Anabolic Steroids: The Physiological Effect of
Placebos, 4 Medicine & Science in Sports 124, 124–25 (1972).
191 Beedie, et al., supra note 189, at 260. R
192 Id. at 261 (the workout consisted of 3 timed sprints of 30 meters each).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 262.
196 Coaches and trainers recognize and exploit this effect at times. See, e.g., Arm-
strong Reasoned Decision, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that a team official “came up R
with a placebo, whittling down an aspirin pill and wrapping it in tin foil” when
cortisone Armstrong requested was unavailable); see also The Mitchell Report: The Ille-
gal Use of Steroids in Major League Baseball: Hearing Before the Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform of the House of Representatives, 110th Cong (2008) (Testimony of Donald
M. Fehr) (“undoubtedly there are [baseball] players, and perhaps most of them, who
use [a prohibited substance] because they think it has [ergogenic] effects whether it
does or not”) (hereinafter “The Mitchell Report”).
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performance—likely affects their rates of use of the substance and any harm
resulting from that use.
Some of the harm from an athlete’s increased use of banned but ulti-
mately ineffective substances is abstract. Regardless of the effect on his
body, the athlete has still violated the rules of his sport. However, if the
substance has negative side effects or injures the athlete’s long-term health,
increased use also means increased physical harm. Therefore, prohibition in
the absence of evidence of actual ergogenic effects may serve to increase de-
mand and harm with no offsetting fairness or other benefit to sport. Of
course, a sporting ban might still make sense even if a collateral effect of the
prohibition is increased demand by some athletes: That is simply a decision
about the permissible parameters of sport. However, this is distinct from
any legal prohibitions on use or governmental enforcement of sporting
regulations.
C. Ignorance Increases Harm from Athletes’ Use of Performance-
Enhancing Substances
In addition to increasing rates of use of performance-enhancing sub-
stances, ignorance about purported performance-enhancing substances in-
creases any harm to athletes that may result from this use in two ways. First,
ignorance critically undermines medical authority so that athletes rely on
faulty anecdotes and rumors, instead of medical advice, in using banned
substances. Second, it ensures that individuals who encourage or even facili-
tate the use of dangerous substances are not legally liable for any harm that
results from their use.
1. Ignorance undermines medical authority
The actual efficacy and long-term effects of many purported perform-
ance-enhancing substances are unknown.197 As a result, for years many med-
ical professionals denied that anabolic steroids had any effect on
performance198 and doctors made dire predictions about the increased likeli-
hood of death and other ill effects in an effort to discourage use of the
drugs.199 However, anecdotal and easily observable examples of steroids’ ef-
fects on users’ bodies,200 coupled with few examples of longtime users exper-
197 See supra Part I.
198 Testimony of Dr. Yesalis, 1989 Steroid Hearings, supra note 38, at 48. R
199 Kayser & Smith, supra note 108, at 87; Testimony of Dr. Yesalis, 1989 Ster- R
oids Hearings, supra note 39, at 48.
200 See infra note 239, and accompanying text (listing examples of these changes). R
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iencing these side effects,201 undermined this official stance. Moreover, in
the high profile BALCO,202 Armstrong203 and Biogenesis204 scandals, doc-
tors and chemists in highly specialized practices worked closely in develop-
ing new performance-enhancing substances for some of the most successful
athletes of the past decade, while journeymen athletes struggle to find
sources for less exotic drugs. As a result, athletes do not trust many main-
stream doctors’ objectivity and medical advice concerning performance-en-
hancing substances.205
This lack of medical authority increases the likelihood athletes’ use of
prohibited substances will physically harm them. It causes athletes to ignore
medical assessments of harm and to fail to disclose information about their
use that is necessary or helpful for diagnosing and treating illness.206 Moreo-
ver, at least some athletes never learn best practices for safe use and, instead,
rely on internet searches and locker room gossip in developing enhancement
regimes, resulting in combinations, dosages, and processes more likely to
harm than to enhance.207 Thus pronouncements about the dangers of en-
hancement become self-fulfilling prophecies.
2. Ignorance prevents legal liability for harm
While information about the potential for harm from use of a perform-
ance-enhancing substance may not discourage its use by an athlete,208 the
associated risk of liability for encouraging use could influence the behavior
201 See Testimony of Dr. Yesalis, 1989 Steroid Hearings, supra note 39, at 48.
202 See supra notes 94–102, and accompanying text. R
203 See supra Introduction, at 3–5.
204 See supra notes 125–128, and accompanying text. R
205 See, e.g., Ivan Waddington & Andy Smith, An Introduction to Drugs in
Sport: Addicted to Winning? 229 (2009) (“[U]sers of anabolic steroids generally
felt that most medical practitioners had little knowledge of their use and were una-
ble to provide unbiased information on different drugs and their effects on health.”);
cf., American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Use of Performance-Enhancing
Substances, 115 Pediatrics 1103, 1103 (2005) (“Attempts to discourage use
through scare tactics or by dismissing known performance-enhancing effects of these
substances may seriously damage the credibility of the physician and do little to
diminish use.”).
206 See supra notes 105–30, and accompanying text. R
207 See Smith & Stewart, supra note 107, at 126; Kayser, et al., supra note 145; see R
also Ian Lovett, ‘Tattooed Guy’ Was Pivotal in Armstrong Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
2012, at B11, archived at http://perma.cc/FVU6-XHCG (relating guesswork in-
volved in determining EPO dose for one user, and resulting side effects).
208 See supra Introduction at 6–7.
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of an athletes’ entourage: the coaches, trainers, team management, team-
mates, and other sports professionals that surround and advise him.
In many instances, an athlete’s decision to use performance-enhancing
substances is not an isolated one. It is based on the advice or encouragement
of his entourage.209 In the absence of hard evidence concerning the causation
of any negative physical effects from an athlete’s use of performance-enhanc-
ing substances, these individuals may be subject to criminal or sporting
sanctions for helping to acquire or cover up use of the drug, but not held
responsible for any harm to the athlete himself. As a result, any harm caused
by the use of prohibited substances is currently borne entirely by the athlete
and not shared by the network that encouraged and facilitated the use.
3. Ignorance increases collateral harms
Prohibition itself may increase the risk of harm from the substances
athletes use. Some of these harms are similar to those caused by prohibitions
of recreational drugs, such as a high reliance on black market, counterfeit,
and/or contaminated formulations.210 Some of the harms, though, are
unique. Athletes emphasize undetectability over efficacy or safety in select-
ing between substances and thus, at times, select more dangerous, but less
easily detected, substances over safer ones. This is the case with, for example,
anabolic steroids. While injectable steroids are more effective and less dam-
aging than oral steroids in the therapeutic context, they stay in the body
weeks longer.211 Thus, the window for detecting them is significantly
greater. Because of this difference, athletes often opt for the oral formula-
209 See Johanna O. Thomas, et al., Illicit Drug Knowledge and Information Seeking
Behaviors Among Elite Athletes, Science & Medic. in Sport 278, 278 (2011); John
Hoberman, ‘Athletes in Handcuffs?’ The Criminalization of Doping, in Mike McNamee
& Verner Moller, Doping and Anti-Doping Policy in Sport 99; Holger Strulik,
Riding High: Success in Sports and the Rise of Doping Cultures, 114 Scand. J. Econom-
ics 539, 541 (2012).
210 See Tokish, et al., supra note 73, at 1544 (reporting annual black market sales R
of steroids in excess of $100 million)
211 See Gov’t Reform Comm., Report on Investigation Into Rafael
Palmeiro’s March 17, 2005, Testimony Before the Comm. on Gov’t Reform15
(reporting that injectable stanozolol is detectable for three to four weeks while oral
formulations are only detectable for seven to ten days); Sidney Gendin, Ban Athletes
Who Don’t Use Steroids, in Performance-Enhancing Drugs 60, 60 (James Haley,
ed.) (2003) (comparing side effects of oral and injectable steroids); Kayser, et al.,
supra note 145 (“The [ease of] detection of oil-based esters of nandrolone, belonging R
to a class of anabolic steroids with little side effects and low risk for hepatic disease,
has led to the use of oral-based analogues with more side effects, but more rapidly
eliminated from the body and thus less easy to detect.”); Paul J. Perry, et al., Ana-
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tions over injectable ones. Moreover, athletes often turn to new and un-
proven substances for which tests are not yet available, instead of those
about which more is known (including how to detect them),212 effectively
acting as guinea pigs in uncontrolled drug trials.213 Alternatively, they at
times use veterinary formulations since they are easier to obtain than prohib-
ited substances that are designed for human use.214 These formulations are
completely untested on humans, and sold in dosages appropriate for the
horses and other large livestock for which they were developed instead of for
much-smaller humans.
While these harms are not the direct product of ignorance concerning
performance-enhancing substances, they do result from prohibitions on the
use of these substances. Where those prohibitions prevent greater harms
from the prohibited substances themselves, the risk of these hams may be
worth taking. However, prohibiting substances based on anecdotes and con-
jecture risks exposing athletes to these additional harms without a reduction
in physical or competitive harm.
What evidence exists suggests that the contemporary regulatory
scheme concerning performance-enhancing substances has been stunningly
ineffective in preventing their use. Instead, it has largely been effective only
in ensuring that legislators, athletes, and fans remain ignorant about the use
and effects of performance-enhancing substances. This ignorance, then, con-
tributes to the use of these substances and increases the harm that results
from this use. While other commentators have suggested increasing the
bolic Steroid Use in Weightlifters and Bodybuilders, 15 Clinical J. Sport Med. 326
(2005) (noting hepatotoxicity risk of oral steroids as opposed to injectable).
212 See L. Elaine Halchin, Report for Cong., RL 32894 CRS-5, Anti-Dop-
ing Policies: The Olympics and Selected Professional Sports (2007); see also
Kirkwood, supra note 146, at 186 (noting that by the time a test for synthetic EPO R
existed, “the substance was already antiquated and athletes had moved on to brand-
new substances with unknown side and long-term effects”).
213 See Willy Voet, Breaking the Chain: Drugs and Cycling: The True
Story 96 (2002) (A first person account of this approach, noting that “[t]o work
out [the effects of clenbuterol] precisely, we needed a guinea-pig . . . . We found the
right man soon enough: me.”).
214 For examples of athletes who tested positive for horse steroids, see Todd
Zolecki, Phillies Minors Pitcher Solano Suspended, MLB.com (Jan. 20, 2011), http://
mlb.mlb.com/news/print.jsp?ymd=20110120&content_id=16471982&vkey=
news_mlb&c_id=mlb; MLB.com, archived at http://perma.cc/CP26-HJQJ; Conway,
Parke Banned 10 Matches for Positive Drug Tests, ESPNsoccernet (Oct. 16, 2008),
http://espnfc.com/news/story?id=582565&sec=mls&cc=5901, archived at http://
perma.cc/4K9X-RJLS; Ivan Trembow, Bonnar Suspended for 9 Months for Steroid Use,
MMAWeekly.com (Nov. 3, 2006), www.mmaweekly.com/bonnar-suspended-9-
months-for-steroid-use-2, archived at http://perma.cc/ZV9-9BXQ.
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sanctions for violations of these regulations, this focus rests on unproven
assumptions about the substances’ effectiveness and capacity to harm, and
fails to recognize the impossibility of rational decision-making in the ab-
sence of information. By contrast, this Article suggests that information
alone can reverse some of the more critical failures with respect to the effec-
tive regulation of performance-enhancing substances while minimizing the
risk of harm to the athletes using them and to the legitimacy of sport.
III. INFORMATION: WHAT DO WE NEED (AND HOW DO WE GET IT)?
More information is, in itself, not necessarily a solution: An endless
search for information can impede decision-making, and in some instances
people make worse decisions when presented with more information.215
Thus, it is important to define narrowly the needed information and connect
it to the current problems it would resolve to ensure the information would
actually affect athletes’ decisions instead of serving merely as an end in itself.
While filling in the details is well beyond the scope of this Article, this Part
concludes by identifying potential sources of data that can be gathered and
analyzed, ethically and efficiently.
While sporting organizations may have different goals, including en-
suring more competitive and engaging events, this analysis emphasizes harm
reduction. Thus, its focus is on identifying the information that will best
help overcome the risk of harm from the regulation and use of performance-
enhancing substances.216 In this, harm is defined broadly, to include harm to
215 See, e.g., Crystal C. Hall, et al., The Illusion of Knowledge: When More Information
Reduces Accuracy and Increases Confidence, 103 Org. Behav. & Human Decision
Processes 277 (2007) (finding that, in predicting the outcome of basketball
games, participants were less accurate, but more confident when provided with ad-
ditional information than when provided only with limited relevant information).
Moreover, the task is not done even once the information is gathered; instead, the
ways in which information is conveyed shapes the decisions people make. See, e.g.,
Jolls, et al., supra note 195, at 1533–34; 1536–37 (discussing role of the presenta-
tion of information in decision-making).
216 Other scholars have also argued in favor of a harm reduction approach to the
regulation of performance-enhancing substances. See, e.g., Ross Coomber, Drugs in
Sport: Rhetoric or Pragmatism, 4 Int’l J. Drug Policy 169 (1993) (advocating a
pragmatic, harm-reduction approach to the regulation of drugs in sport); Kayser &
Broers, supra note 145, at 33 (citing “needle and syringe exchange programmes, safe R
use facilities, opiate substitution therapy, overdose prevention and chemical analysis
of party drug” as successful harm reduction strategies concerning recreational
drugs); Kayser & Smith, supra note 108, at 87 (arguing in favor of regulating ath- R
letes’ health rather than their doping).
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competition and public support for elite sport, as well as direct physical
harm to athletes themselves.
A. Information We Need (and Why We Need It)
There are five types of information that are critical to overcoming the
biases and miscalculations described above, namely: (1) data concerning the
rates of use of performance-enhancing substances by athletes; (2) identifica-
tion of substances commonly thought to be performance enhancing that fail
to deliver an ergogenic effect; (3) examples of athletes for whom doping did
not equate with athletic success; (4) verifiable causal links between enhance-
ments and physical injury; and (5) identification of the substances used by
athletes.
1. Rates of use
Estimates of rates of performance-enhancing substances use by athletes
vary widely—between 1%217 and 95%.218 This range may be due to the
populations studied in each case, the definition of “use” employed, the way
data is collected, or the fact that athletes are not necessarily forthcoming
about their use. In any event, the extreme breadth of this range indicates
that we simply do not know whether doping is an occasional practice of
relatively small groups of athletes or if it is commonplace throughout elite
sport.219
Obtaining this information is critical:220 Data concerning the perva-
siveness of doping within different sports would clarify for athletes whether
their own use of performance-enhancing substances provides them an advan-
tage over competitors or if it levels a playing field otherwise tilted by others’
doping. Moreover, it would allow governing bodies to address enhancement
in a more finely tuned way than is possible currently.
If background rates of enhancement are low in a sport, many athletes
using performance-enhancing substances may well choose to stop using
217 This figure is based on actual rates of positive doping tests. See Abrahamson,
supra note 116. R
218 Petroczi, et al., supra note 124, at 20. R
219 See Carnegie Research Institute, Leeds Metropolitan University, Interna-
tional Literature Review: Attitudes, Behaviors, Knowledge and Educa-
tion—Drugs in Sport: Past, Present and Future 91 (2007) (“At the present time
a reliable estimate of prevalence is yet to be established.”).
220 Social scientists Berno Buechel, Eike Emrich, and Stefanie Pohlkamp called
this the most important scientific question concerning doping. See Buechel, et al.,
supra note 108, at 2. R
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them. This is because doping has a strong social norm component: In evalu-
ating whether to use performance-enhancing substances, the attitude of fel-
low athletes influence an individual’s decision-making in two important
ways.221
First, when caught for using banned substances, many athletes protest
that they were simply doing what others in their sport were doing.222 Thus,
they claim they were not gaining an advantage over the competition, but
merely participating according to the same unwritten rules. Taken at face
value, this would mean that these individuals believe they are only doping
defensively—in response to perceived doping by others.223 Even if this is just
a rationalization, revealing it as a false one could prove helpful. The claim
itself seems to be a way to differentiate enhancement that the athlete be-
lieves to be cheating—that meant to chemically assist his performance—
from that which he believes is legitimate—meant to allow him to maintain
his relative rank in the athletic hierarchy. To the extent actual rates of use in
a sport are low, athletes deciding whether to use banned substances will
know they are choosing between cheating and competing on their own mer-
its, forcing a more honest evaluation of the situation.
Additionally, in many instances athletes learn about doping and are
encouraged in their use of prohibited substances by their compatriots.224 In
sports where sufficiently many athletes are doping, this practice means that
the use of prohibited substances becomes the norm.225 Even the perception
that many others are using prohibited substances can influence the develop-
ment of this norm, since peer influence comes from what individuals think
others believe or do, not necessarily what is objectively true.226
To the extent athletes currently overestimate the use of banned sub-
stances by their peers, information about sport-specific rates of use may suc-
cessfully reduce enhancement where regulations have failed. Research into
peer influence on underage drinking shows that many adolescents increase
221 Holger Strulik, Riding High: Success in Sports and the Rise of Doping Cultures,
114 Scand. J. Economics 539 (2012).
222 See supra note 169. R
223 See Kenneth Kirkwood, Defensive Doping: Is There a Moral Justification for ‘If
You Can’t Beat ‘Em—Join ‘Em?’, 36 J. Sport & Social Issues 223, 224–25 (2012)
(summarizing and critiquing the distinction between offensive and defensive
doping).
224 Strulik, supra note 221, at 541. R
225 Id.
226 See H. Wesley Perkins, The Emergence and Evolution of the Social Norms Approach
to Substances Abuse Prevention, in The Social Norms Approach to Preventing
School and College Age Substance Abuse 8 (H. Wesley Perkins, ed., John Wiley
& Sons 2003) (hereinafter “Perkins, Social Norms”).
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their own consumption of alcohol to match more closely what they believe is
the average rate of drinking by their peers.227 In that context, interventions
focused on publicizing actual rates of consumption have dramatically re-
duced rates of heavy drinking.228 Thus, to the extent athletes currently over-
estimate the prevalence of banned substance use among their competitors
and alter their own use as a result, it may be that simply learning actual
rates of use would decrease the use of performance-enhancing substances.229
Furthermore, different rates of enhancement suggest different anti-dop-
ing enforcement approaches. If research shows that very few athletes engage
in doping in a specific sport, then it may be that the current approach—
focusing on testing the highest achievers with some small amount of ran-
dom testing farther down—is effectively capturing the most problematic
use within that sport and preventing much of the possible harm. Moreover,
more recent efforts to monitor biological profiles230 and power output,231
and to strategically test athletes who turn in aberrational values or perform-
ances, should go a long way to ensuring athletes do not use doping to get
ahead of their competition.
However, to the extent enhancement is pervasive within a sport,232 this
testing and monitoring for abnormalities can be expected to capture very
227 Id. at 9.
228 Michael P. Haines & Gregory P. Barker, The Northern Illinois University Exper-
iment, in Perkins, Social Norms, supra note 226, at 21; H. Wesley Perkins & David R
W. Craig, The Hobart and William Smith Colleges Experiment, in Perkins, Social
Norms, supra note 226, at 35. R
229 Of course, this information could have the opposite effect: To the extent ath-
letes are more interested in using banned substances to get ahead than to level the
field, learning about low rates of use in their sport may encourage increased doping.
However, this is not a reason to remain ignorant, but a reason to monitor any
interventions carefully and adjust them as needed.
230 See supra note 89 discussing the biological passport program. R
231 Intriguingly, some sports scientists did this for Tour de France riders in
2013. Exercise physiologist Ross Tucker estimated power output by the top riders
on the hardest climbs of the 2013 Tour and compared these calculations to past
performances known to be doping-fueled. In doing so, he identified specific per-
formances that pushed the limits of physiological possibility. See James Dao, Watch-
dogs Seek Doping Clues From a Distance, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2013, at B11, archived
at http://perma.cc/9TKC-U7EM; see also Ross Tucker, The Power of the Tour de France:
Performance analysis, laying the groundwork, The Science of Sport, (July 3, 2013),
http://www.sportsscientists.com/2013/07/the-power-of-tour-de-france-performance.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/TJ5D-PLZY (explaining the “pVAM” method
used by Tucker to calculate and interpret riders’ power output).
232 WADA’s own research suggests this is the case in at least some sports. See
Rohan, supra notes 135-138 (discussing track and field athletes’ admitted rates of R
use in a recent WADA study).
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little of the existing use. Since most athletes will likely not be tested, and
most performances will not appear anomalous—instead, the general per-
formance level will just be elevated—enhancement will remain common
and necessary for anyone interested in participating at the sport’s highest
level. Thus, for any sport in which use is above some threshold point that
routine testing should control, regulators will need to develop a different
approach. Depending on the sport, that approach may be making a substan-
tial economic investment in widescale testing until the sport’s norms
change, working with sports organizations to change social norms concern-
ing doping, or regulating hormone levels and other physiological markers
rather than testing for substance use.233
From a policy and regulatory perspective, data concerning the back-
ground rates of doping on a sport-specific level is the most critical piece of
missing information. Without it, it is impossible to evaluate the success or
failure of a regulatory regime based on testing. Moreover, this information
would help athletes locate their intended behavior within the actual norms
of their sport instead of presumptions based on guesswork and the most
visible examples.
2. Identity of “performance-enhancing substances” that do not
enhance performance
In discussing the troubling absence of information about performance-
enhancing substances, other commentators have largely focused on the lack
of safety information.234 In these analyses, the implicit or explicit assumption
is that if athletes knew a substance was unsafe, either in terms of its imme-
diate side effects or long-term physical harm, they would choose not to use
the substance. Thus, FDA oversight of safety testing for supplements and
drugs as used for enhancement proves a common prescription.235 Yet, as
previously discussed, risk of physical harm is not a dissuading factor for
233 This is already done in some instances. For example, in addition to testing for
EPO, some sports federations regulate blood doping by capping the proportion of
red blood cells in an athlete’s bloodstream. A level too high results in the athlete
being declared unfit for the instant competition, but does not result in an anti-
doping violation. Mario Ziroli, Biological Passport Parameters, 6 J. Human Sport &
Exercise 2, 205 (2011).
234 See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Biological Enhancement, 56 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 1139 (2008) (discussing the ways athletes use banned substances that have
never been scientifically tested or are not otherwise known to be safe).
235 Id.
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many elite athletes who routinely put their health and their bodies at risk as
an everyday part of their training and competing.236
Instead, a more relevant risk from an elite athlete’s perspective is that
of a nonergogenic effect from a banned substance: it simply doesn’t work. In
this case, the athlete risks detection and punishment without receiving a
performance benefit, and in some instances may have his performance im-
paired. The cost-benefit equation is clearly tilted against use. Thus, to the
extent research establishes that a substance commonly thought to be per-
formance-enhancing fails to provide an ergogenic boost, information alone
should eliminate its without need for regulation or anti-doping controls.237
The scientific literature contains hints and suggestions concerning pro-
hibited substances that may not enhance performance, at least under some
important circumstances.238 Intriguingly, at least some uses of anabolic ster-
oids may be in this category for elite athletes. In summarizing the existing
research into the use of steroids, Eric Boyce lists increases in strength (by
14%-18%), muscle size, and lean body mass (8%).239 Seemingly proof of the
ergogenic effects of steroids, the data behind these studies prove less beneficial
for elite athletes upon close inspection: Boyce specifies that the studies
showing strength increases used untrained and elderly men as subjects.240
Importantly, Boyce concluded that, “[T]here was no difference in the
strength of elite, highly trained athletes between those who used and those
who did not use anabolic-androgenic steroids.”241 These results raise the
question whether anabolic steroids increase maximum attainable strength,
or merely reduce the time and effort needed to achieve maximum
strength.242 In other words, athletes who are already at the top of their
sports may not enhance their performances through the use of anabolic ster-
oids. If that is, in fact, the case, then there is no reason other than ignorance
236 See Introduction, supra, and supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text. R
237 Ross Tucker has opined that substances that have not been established to
provide an ergogenic effect should be removed from sporting prohibitions in order
to simplify, and thus improve the credibility of, enforcement of anti-doping regula-
tions. Ross Tucker, Time to rethink sports doping, Sport Live (July 22, 2013, 7:54),
http://www.sportlive.co.za/opinion/article9581915.ece.
238 See, e.g., D.S. King, et al., A-Z of Nutritional Supplements: Dietary Supplements,
Sports Nutrition Foods and Ergogenic Aids for Health and Performance—Part 34, 46
Brit. J. Sports Medicine 689, 689–690 (2012) (finding that ribose and smilax,
prohormones commonly thought to enhance athletic performance, fail to provide an
ergogenic benefit).
239 Boyce, supra note 78, at 25. R
240 Id. at 26.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 27.
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about the actual effects of these substances for athletes to continue to use
steroids to gain strength or speed once they have reached the elite level.
In addition, the use of steroids by elite athletes may at times have a
negative effect on performance. Gains in muscle size and lean body mass not
associated with strength gains may simply be increases in water weight.243
In many sports, larger size is itself not correlated with success; only in sports
like football or sumo wrestling do size gains, independent of increases in
strength, improve performance.244 In other sports, for athletes who have al-
ready attained their maximum strength, the use of steroids may not help,
and could actually hurt, performance by simply adding unaerodynamic
water weight to carry around.245
If anabolic steroids do not enhance performance for elite athletes, then
current prohibitions and enforcement mechanisms are not preventing en-
hancement. As previously shown, prohibition itself may increase the use of
the banned substances both by suggesting the substances enhance perform-
ance and due to psychological reactance.246 Testing, though, only focuses on
use by elite athletes; actual ergogenic effect is not required for a positive test,
and only in rare cases are developing athletes monitored closely.247 As a
result, current testing may only capture steroid use by those athletes who do
not actually benefit from it contemporaneously. It may be that information
alone could curb the use of anabolic steroids by athletes who have already
attained the elite level,248 freeing resources for use in other more effective
anti-doping efforts.
243 See Fred Hartgens & Harm Kuipers, Effects of Androgenic-Anabolic Steroids in
Athletes, 34 Sports Med. 513, 519 (2004).
244 See generally, David Epstein, The Sports Gene (2013) (discussing, inter alia,
data on ideal body types by sport).
245 See Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 243, at 519. R
246 See Brehm, Control, Its Loss, and Psychological Reactance, supra notes 187–188, R
and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 161–93, and accompanying text. R
248 Similarly, economist Kjetil Haugen has provocatively suggested that,
Research on doping effectiveness may also be an interesting strategy. If
athletes believe (more strongly than they actually have scientific reason to
do so) in the effects of dope, then the task of fighting doping may . . . be a
very hard one . . . . [O]pen knowledge about actual effects of various dop-
ing strategies may, by itself, prove valuable in the fight against doping.
Kjetil Haugen, The Performance-Enhancing Drug Game, 5 J. Sports Economics 67,
85 (2004).
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3. Examples of enhancement failures
Currently, the examples of enhancement that are the most highly visi-
ble are enhancement successes: Athletes who used performance-enhancing
substances and became highly successful in their sports.249 However, en-
hancement failures are undoubtedly more common. Identifying and pub-
licizing these cases could help undermine the current strong association
between doping and athletic success by providing visible counter-narratives.
For example, statistical analysis of data on baseball players identified as
using performance-enhancing substances found that “There is no example of
a mediocre player breaking away from the middle of the pack and achieving
stardom with the aid of drugs.”250 Instead, close examination of players’
performances immediately before and in the years after each was alleged to
begin their use of these substances undercuts the narrative that steroids and
other banned substances as actually used by athletes significantly alter base-
ball players’ performance given the complexity and variety of skills required
for success. Specifically, the study concludes that, “in most cases the drugs
had either little or a negative effect.”251
This story, though, is not the one usually told about performance-en-
hancing substance use in baseball. Instead, the public narrative of enhance-
ment is a glamorous one of home run championships or skinny players
bulking up and garnering multi-million dollar paydays along the way.
What if equal time was given to the player who never made it out of the
minor leagues despite his use of steroids, HGH, and andro? Or to the aging
player, desperate to hold onto his career and fame, whose performance tailed
off in a pattern similar to that of Babe Ruth or Joe DiMaggio despite regular
injections of steroids and HGH?
For many athletes, telling these stories—putting faces on enhance-
ment’s mediocrity, failure, and decline—could well prove more persuasive
in dissuading use than citing statistics about the probability of long-term
harm from the use of various substances. While objective evidence of harm
may be persuasive to individuals who are already disinclined to use banned
substances, narrative examples of enhancement failures may prove more ef-
fective at persuading individuals biased in favor of use to change their pref-
249 See supra notes 150–155, and accompanying text (defining enhancement suc- R
cess and failure and discussing the reasons for this high visibility).
250 Jonathan R. Cole & Stephen M. Stigler, More Juice, Less Punch, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/opinion/22cole.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/3787-B5RL. The study on which this op-ed is based is
currently unpublished.
251 See id.
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erences.252 Thus, providing visibility to the many athletes who have used
performance-enhancing substances but not become superstars, or who ceased
improving after beginning heavy use, or who have experienced performance
setbacks due to their use of banned substances may ultimately dissuade more
athletes from use, and especially use that results in cognizable harm, than
statistical data concerning risk of physical harm.
4. Proof of harm
While most likely ineffective in dissuading use by many athletes,
sound data concerning injury causation could affect decisions by an athlete’s
entourage to encourage or assist doping. If, for example, research established
a link between the enhancement use of anabolic steroids and brain tumors,
individuals who promote and assist in this use, as well those providing the
drugs, could be held civilly liable for the resulting injuries.
Of course, in the case of anabolic steroids these individuals may already
be criminally liable under the CSA.253 However, athletes currently have lit-
tle or no incentive to assist the government in pursuing convictions because,
at best, revealing use will negatively impact their own athletic legacies and,
at worst, they could also be prosecuted themselves for their illegal use of
these substances.254 In addition, athletes receive no personal vindication for
the convictions—no acknowledgement of the damage to their bodies—since
the underlying offense is selling or otherwise distributing prohibited sub-
stances, not causing harm to the athlete.255
Because of the lack of data concerning physical harm caused by banned
substances, athletes currently internalize all of the risks from the use of per-
formance-enhancing substances despite the fact that use is seldom a com-
pletely isolated act. Establishing harm causation means an athlete could
recoup medical costs and other damages from the personnel involved in his
252 This disparity occurs at least in the context of changing behavior towards
alcohol use. See Michael D. Slater & Donna Rouner, Value-Affirmative and Value-
Protective Processing of Alcohol Education Messages That Include Statistical Evidence or
Anecdotes, 23 Communication Research 210 (1996). See also John B.F. de Wit, et
al., What Works Best: Objective Statistics or a Personal Testimonial? An Assessment of the
Persuasive Effects of Different Types of Message Evidence on Risk Perception, 27 Health
Psychology 110 (2008) (finding narrative evidence more successful than statistical
data in communicating health risks to participants otherwise inclined to undertake
high risk sexual behavior).
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use of ultimately harmful substances, under either battery or negligence the-
ories, ultimately reducing the likelihood that these individuals would en-
courage and assist in the use in the first place.
5. What athletes are actually taking
For as little information as we have about what athletes believe they are
taking, we know even less about what in fact they are injecting and in-
gesting. Because many desired substances cannot be obtained legally, and
even where they can be they require a doctor’s prescription, athletes often
obtain the substances they use through black market or other untrustworthy
sources.256 In many instances, the labeling and contents of these substances
do not match. For example, one study of steroids obtained from black mar-
kets found that 53% of the injectable steroid samples and 21% of the oral
ones were counterfeit and, in some cases, contaminated with bacteria known
to cause abscesses.257 Another study found that only four of eleven confis-
cated black market performance enhancement products actually contained
what their labels advertise.258 Even when obtained from reputable sources,
this mismatch between contents and labeling exists routinely for supple-
ments.259 As a result, even studies that successfully elicit truthful responses
from athletes about what they use do little to reveal what they actually use.
If we do not know what substances athletes are actually taking,
thoughtfully reducing the use of harmful substances and minimizing any
harm resulting from their use becomes nearly impossible. Athletes cannot
possibly make a rational decision about whether to use a potentially enhanc-
ing substance without knowing, in the first instance, what is in the product
they propose to use. Moreover, no generalizable causal link between sub-
stance use and any outcome—positive or negative—is possible where the
substance used is unidentified.
Further revealing the importance of information concerning what is
contained in the products used by athletes, interventions intended to reduce
optimism biases prove successful only where they offer individuals informa-
tion about their own particular likelihood of experiencing a potential
256 See Tokish et al., supra note 73, and accompanying text. R
257 Michael R. Graham, et al., Counterfeiting in Performance- and Image-Enhancing
Drugs, 1 Drug Testing & Analysis 135 (2009).
258 Kohler, et al., supra note 74, at 536–37.
259 See id. at 536–37 (discussing the lack of consistency in the contents of nutri-
tional supplements).
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harm.260 More general manipulations, such as alerting participants to rele-
vant risk factors for health hazards,261 presenting risk factors in a way that
encourage participants to see their own status as non-ideal,262 inducing par-
ticipants to visualize a person who embodied high risk factors before judg-
ing their own risk,263 and asking participants to generate a list of factors that
would increase or decrease a risk,264 each served, contrary to the researchers’
expectations, to exacerbate pre-existing optimism biases.265 As a result, com-
mon strategies intended to decrease undesirable behavior, such as media
campaigns emphasizing the negative effects of substance use, may well in-
crease athletes’ tendency to unreasonably discount these risks.266 Successfully
reducing the optimism bias instead requires specific information about an
athlete’s own likelihood of experiencing a negative outcome; absent informa-
tion about what substances an athlete is actually taking, this level of speci-
ficity is impossible.
We currently know very little about performance-enhancing substances
and athletes’ use of them. What we do know is that, in at least some critical
instances, the current regulatory approach is largely ineffective in preventing
and detecting their use. Instead of continuing to legislate in the dark, the
focus of lawmakers and sporting organizations should be on obtaining the
most critical information we currently lack in order to more effectively pre-
vent harm to the athletes using these substances, to competitors deciding
whether to use them, and to the spirit of competition.
B. Sources of Information
If information concerning performance-enhancing substances and their
use by athletes were easy to collect, it would undoubtedly already have been
done: Both Congress and researchers have acknowledged the need for more
information for at least half a century.267 However, because doping is a cov-
260 Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions
to Debiasing Interventions, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intui-
tive Judgment 313, 322 (Thomas Gilovich, et al., eds, Cambridge University Press
2002).
261 Id. at 314–16.
262 Id. at 316–17.
263 Id. at 317–20.
264 Id. at 320–22.
265 Id. at 322.
266 Id. at 323.
267 See supra notes 53–62 & 77–83, and accompanying text; see also Kayser & R
Smith, supra note 108, at 87 (“rigorous clinical and policy studies are imperative”); R
David R. McDuff & David Baron, Substance Use in Athletics: A Sports Psychiatry Per-
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ert activity, information about it is elusive: Even where use is common in an
athlete’s cohort, many of the specifics remain private. Moreover, when testi-
mony or other evidence establishes an athlete’s use of banned substances,
public and official attention focuses on the identity of other transgressors—
who assisted the athlete in obtaining, learning about, and using prohibited
substances, and who else used them—not the specifics of use. The resulting
ignorance in turn increases athletes’ use of banned substances, increasing the
potential for harm.
Yet this ignorance does not need to persist. The amount of information
that exists about performance-enhancing substances is staggering: Athletes
keep exhaustive records of their use, team personnel monitor and medical
professionals and adapt programs for efficacy for the athletes under their
care, and human bodies register and record the effects of substances taken
long after their use is discontinued. What if, instead of focusing on finger-
pointing and retroactive record-erasing, anti-doping efforts were focused on
accumulating the information already available but largely unanalyzed in
order to develop a more effective and less harmful approach to enhancement
for the future?
A primary source of information concerning athletes’ use of perform-
ance-enhancing substances and the effects of use on their bodies exists in the
exhaustive documentation kept by many teams, physicians and athletes. For
example:
• Professional cycling teams records that detail the riders’ drug protocols
and the physical effects of enhancement in minute detail;268
• United States Olympic Committee records from 1991-2000 that, over
the course of 30,000 pages, detail the use of prohibited substances by
United States athletes;269
spective, 24 Clinics in Sports Med. 895 (2005) (calling for large scale clinical trials
where possible); Melethil, supra note 86, at 88 (calling for animal studies where R
human trials are not possible).
268 See, e.g., Armstrong Reasoned Decision, supra note 5, at 77 & 109 R
(describing internal testing and calibrations on the United States Postal Service cy-
cling team). See also Benjamin D. Brewer, Commercialization in Professional Cycling
1950-2001: Institutional Transformations and the Rationalization of “Doping”, 19 Soci-
ology Sport J. 276, 294 (2002) (chronicling oversight and tracking of doping by team
management); Juliet Macur, Welcoming Testing, Team Battles Cycling’s Image, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 13, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/sports/
othersports/13cycle.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (focusing on internal testing
and record-keeping by the Slipstream professional cycling team).
269 See Tim Layden & Don Yaeger, Playing Favorites?, Sports Illustrated (Apr.
21, 2003) (describing records possessed by Dr. Wade Exum, the USOC’s former
director of drug control administration).
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• East German records reporting the results of doping research and the
use of performance-enhancing substances by the country’s top athletes
since 1966;270
• An as-yet-unpublished 800-page report detailing West German dop-
ing since the 1950s;271 and
• Records from the BALCO272 and Biogenesis investigations.273
Gathering and analyzing this information should be the focus of officials
investigating collateral or past instances of doping. While these records are
not always based on scientific experiments, they provide much more infor-
mation than is currently available. The current emphasis on retroactive pun-
ishment means that, instead, athletes and team personnel have strong
incentive to destroy their records at the first hint of trouble,274 perpetuating
ignorance of the use and effects of performance-enhancing substances.
A further source of information is athletes themselves. As indicated by
the 2011 WADA survey of track and field athletes,275 if properly assured of
anonymity many athletes will provide some of the critical data that is cur-
rently lacking. Cooperating athletes should not receive amnesty for any use
they disclose as part of the process, but the data itself should not be able to
be used against the athletes providing it. While this data would be com-
prised of anecdotes and suffer from the usual self-reporting constraints,276 in
the aggregate it could prove helpful in identifying rates of use of prohibited
substances, athletes’ beliefs about these substances, and how the substances
are actually used by athletes.
Furthermore, researchers should gather data concerning the long-term
effects of performance-enhancing substance use from athletes known to have
used these substances. This could be accomplished in two ways. Recently
270 See Charles E. Yesalis & Michael S. Bahrke, History of Doping in Sport, in Per-
formance-Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise 9 (Michael S. Bahrke &
Charles E. Yesalis, eds.) (noting the existence of these records).
271 See Study Says West Germany Used Doping, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2013, at SP10,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/sports/study-says-west-germanys-
athletes-used-doping.html (revealing existence of the study).
272 See supra notes 94–102, and accompanying text. R
273 See supra notes 125–128, and accompanying text. R
274 At times, this destruction is even legally mandated. See Juliet Macur, Spanish
Judge Orders Destruction of Evidence, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2013, at B19, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/sports/cycling/spanish-doctor-sentenced-in-
operation-puerto-doping-case-in-cycling.html.
275 See supra notes 135–138, and accompanying text (discussing the survey). R
276 For example, there would most likely be a selection bias among those who
agreed to participate and some athletes may further choose not to be truthful in
order to maintain a competitive advantage or because they distrust the
intermediary.
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retired athletes could be offered amnesty from invalidation of records and
public disclosure of use in return for disclosure of past use to sporting re-
searchers and on-going physical monitoring. In addition, researchers should
follow-up with the high school and college athletes who were the subjects of
early experiments concerning anabolic steroids277 to determine the effects on
their morbidity and other aspects of long-term health. In each case, careful
collection and analysis of this data could help identity any real long-term
health consequences to the use of steroids and other substances as enhance-
ments, not therapy.
Finally, a number of doctors could be trained to assist athletes in safe
practices to the extent they feel comfortable doing so within the bounds of
their professional responsibilities.278 While this would not need to extend to
issuing prescriptions or otherwise procuring substances for use by athletes, it
could include testing substances obtained by athletes prior to use to identify
the contents, and working with researchers to provide anonymized data on
the substances used and observed physical effects. This assistance could serve
to reduce collateral harms from doping, including harm from unsafe
processes and contaminated substances,279 provide valuable real-time infor-
mation to researchers about the enhancements being employed by athletes,
and help rehabilitate the reputation of medical professionals with athletes.280
Of course, collating and organizing this information in a meaningful
way would be a daunting task. However, models for similarly mammoth
information-gathering and analysis exist. For example, using its “Sentinel”
system, the FDA collects the electronic records of prescriptions filled, associ-
ated diagnoses, and adverse events. From these records, then, it derives pat-
terns of causality between events that historically simply took too much
277 See Yesalis & Bahrke, supra note 270, at 65–66 (describing the studies). R
278 But see John Hoberman, Sports Physicians and the Doping Crisis in Elite Sport, 12
Clinical J. Sports Med. 203 (2002) (summarizing ethical conflicts inherent in doc-
tors’ participation in doping, even where it reduces the harm to the athletes in-
volved); see also Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: Team Physicians vs.
Athlete-Patients, 50 St. Louis U. L.J. 185 (2005) (examining the ethical conflicts
that team physicians employed by teams have when treating athletes, particularly
when using substances or procedures with questionable therapeutic value); Barry R.
Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor: Serving Two (Or is it Three or Four?) Masters,
50 St. Louis U. L.J. 165 (2005) (same).
279 For this reason, other commentators have also suggested encouraging medical
oversight of athletes’ doping. See, e.g., Preface, in Murray, et al., Performance-
Enhancing Technologies, supra note 25 (discussing this approach). But see Urban
Wiesing, Should Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Sport be Legalized Under Medical Su-
pervision?, 41 Sports Medicine 167 (2011) (arguing against this approach).
280 See supra notes 197–207, and accompanying text. R
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manpower to analyze.281 The FDA intends the system to identify and quan-
tify adverse-events quickly and accurately, optimizing the safety and efficacy
of medication.282 In addition, researchers have been collecting and analyzing
medication and symptom-related queries entered into major search engines,
allowing them to identify evidence of otherwise-unreported drug side effects
more quickly than under formal warning systems.283 Similarly, collecting
and analyzing the large repositories of data concerning the use of perform-
ance-enhancing substances, in combination with novel approaches to gather-
ing contemporary information anonymously, may well yield significant
insights into the use of these substances. While the details remain to be
worked out, the critically needed information is not unknowable or, in some
instances, truly unknown.
CONCLUSION
The current approach to regulating the use of performance-enhancing
substances has proven ineffective. Repeated scandals and WADA’s own re-
search shows that, at least in many sports, the use of prohibited substances is
pervasive. The only thing more pervasive, it seems, is ignorance about
enhancement.
This ignorance is in many ways voluntary: The information we need to
overcome it in many cases exists, but is uncollected, unpreserved, and
unanalyzed. This Article argues in favor of an approach to regulating per-
formance enhancement that emphasizes reducing the risk of harm from use
of these substances in a way that is both pragmatic and persuasive given the
norms and practices of elite sport.
281 Jerry Avorn & Sebastian Schneeweiss, Managing Drug-Risk Information—What
to Do with All Those New Numbers, 361 New Eng. J. Med. 647, 647 (2009).
282 Id. at 649.
283 Ryen W. White, et al., Web-Scale pharmacovigilance: listening to signals from the
crowd, J. Am. Med. Informatics Ass’n 403 (2013).
